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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a sojourn into institutional economics and its application to 
contemporary economic and development issues in South Africa. Economic 
development initiatives in agribusiness have much to gain from the theories and 
approaches advanced by the new institutional economics. Institutions are considered 
essential to the functioning of economies, markets and organizations, despite its 
neglect in neoclassical economics The study intends to prove that 'institutions matter', 
especially when social and economic transformation is necessary. The cases studied 
exhibit how institutions matter and shape economic outcomes. 
The theoretical basis established in this thesis was applied to economic development 
challenges such as contracting, organizational innovation, economic empowerment, 
land reform, building social capital, organizational design, supply chain management, 
entrepreneurial development, and modes of constructive engagement. The thesis is a 
compilation of academic papers applied to the various selected developmental 
challenges prevalent in South African agriculture. 
The study begins by delving into the more popular New Institutional Economics 
literature and specifically transaction cost economics. Somewhat unexpectedly, this 
leads to a greater appreciation for the insights generated by the Old Institutionalists in 
investigating the nature of institutions. Hence, the old institutional economics gains 
prominence in the latter part of this work, contrary to contemporary approaches 
followed in agricultural economics. The acknowledgement given to aspects like social 
capital and embeddedness is consistent with Williamson's proposed framework for 
the economics of institutions and this is used as the conceptual framework in this 
thesis. 
Whereas the new institutional economics was found to be useful in yielding 
knowledge through analysis and remediable outcomes, the old institutional economics 
retains its advantage in promoting understanding of problems especially in the face of 
complexity. This inclination has influenced the thesis in two ways. First, it diverted 
the latter part of the work towards the old institutional economics and the role of 
social capital in shaping institutions and economic behaviour. Second, it reverts to 
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theories on the nature of the firm that complements the transaction cost approach. The 
transaction costs approach is thus only used where it is found most effective i.e. 
analysing vertical integration between firms and the relevant ex ante incentives and 
the ex post governance aspects 
Most studies are motivated by a general recognition of the role of institutions in 
framing economic outcomes and end up in the new institutional economics and 
subsequently transactions cost economics. This favouring of the transaction cost 
approach has found appeal due to its ability to predict structural and organisational 
outcomes such as the efficient boundaries of firms, internal organisation, contractual 
relations, incentives, etc. Methodologically, it enables analysts to employ the 
empirical and mathematical rigour that has become a feature, but too often the 
purpose, of economic research. Three papers are devoted to this approach and elicit 
organisational designs that best contend with identified transaction costs. 
The study confirms that several aspects matter in institutional analysis when applied 
in an economic developmental context such as South Africa. Historical context is 
acknowledged as a critical facet of institutional analyses in the sense that institutions 
are shaped by the forces of history. Social capital is established as an important 
component of institutional economic analysis and particularly relevant in situations 
where social capital has been eroded by political economic manipulations. Attending 
to social capital require (inter alia) insight into the nature of the societal context, 
implied path dependency, the extent of trust, enforcement mechanisms, and agency 
relations. Three of the papers attend to these aspects. 
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SAMEVATTING 
Die proefskrif bevat 'n toepassing van institusionele ekonomie op kontemporere 
ekonomiese- en ontwikkelingskwessies in Suid Afrika. Die nuwe institusionele 
ekonomie het veel te hied tot ekonomiese ontwikkelingsinisiatiewe vera! in 
agribesigheid. Institusies word beskou as essentieel tot die funksionering van die 
ekonomie, markte en organisasies, ongeag, die nalaat daarvan in die neoklassieke 
ekonomie. Die studie poog om te bewys dat 'institusies geld', vera! wanneer sosiale 
en ekonomiese transformasie noodsaaklik is. 
Die teoretiese basis wat gevestig is in die proefskrif, vind toepassing op ekonomiese 
ontwikkelingsuitdagings wat insluit kontraktering, organisatoriese innovasie, 
ekonomiese bemagtiging, grondhervorming, bou van sosiale kapitaal, organisatoriese 
ontwerp, waardeketting bestuur, entrepreneurskap ontwikkeling, en modes vir 
konstruktiewe omgang. 
Die studie begin met teoretiese 'n ondersoek in die meer populere nuwe institusionele 
ekonomiese literatuur, en spesifiek transaksie koste ekonomie. Dit lei later tot 'n 
onverwagse waardering vir die insigting wat die ou institusionele ekonomie genereer, 
wanneer die aard van institusies bestudeer word. Gevolglik, verkry die ou 
institusionele ekonomie prominensie in die latere deel van die studie, in teenstelling 
met die landbou ekonomiese benaderings wat deesdae bespeur word. Die erkenning 
aan sosiale kapitaal en institusionele ingeworteldheid is in tred Williamson se 
voorgestelde raamwerk vir die ekonomie van institusies is word gebruik as die 
konseptuele raamwerk in die tesis. 
Waar die nuwe institusionele ekonomie nuttig is in die werwing van kennis, is die ou 
institusionele ekonomie nuttig in die kweek van insig en verstaan van probleme en 
kompleksiteit. Die proefskrifword op twee maniere hierdeur beinvloed. Eerstens, leun 
die latere deel van die werk meer na die ou institusionele ekonomie en die rol van 
sosiale kapitaal in die vorming van institusies en ekonomiese gedrag. Tweedens, 
verskaf dit 'n fokus op die teoriee oor die aard van die firma wat komplimenter staan 
tot transaksie koste ekonomie. Die transaksie koste benadering word aangewend in 
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die ontleding van vertikale integrasie tussen firmas en die relevante ex ante insentiewe 
en ex post strukture, waar dit vera! nuttig is. 
Meeste studies erken die invloed van institusies op ekomiese uitkomste en gebruik 
hoofsaaklik die nuwe institusionele ekonomie en transaksie koste ekonomie. Hierdie 
vooroordeel ten opsigte van transaksie koste ekonomie, vind byval as gevolg van die 
vermoe om strukturele en organisatoriese uitkomstes te voorspel soos die 
doeltreffendheidsdrumpel van firmas, interne orgasnisasie, kontrakte, insentiewe, ens. 
Metodologies, moedig dit empiriese en wiskundige benaderings tot ontleding aan, wat 
ongelukkig a! die doe! geword het in vele ekonomiese ondersoeke. Drie van die 
referate wat in die proefskrif vervat word, behels die identifisering van toepaslike 
organisatoriese ontwerpe wat geskoei is op die transaksie kostes wat geldentifieer is. 
Die studie bevestig dat sekere aspekte van belang is in institusionele ondersoeke, vera! 
in 'n ekonomiese ontwikkelingskonteks soos Suid Afrika. Historiese konteks, word 
erken as a kritieke faktor in institusionele ontledings, in die sin dat institusies 
onontbeerlik deur geskiedkundige kragte gevorm word. Sosiale kapitaal word ook 
erken as 'n belangrike komponent in institusionele ekonomiese ontledings, vera! in 
omstandighede waar sosiale kapitaal verweer het as gevolg van polities ekonomiese 
manipulasies. Dit veries dat aandag geskenk work aan, ( onder and ere) sosiale konteks, 
gelmpliseerde koers afhanklikheid, vertoue, afdwingbare meganismes, en agentskap 
verhoudings. Drie van die referate word hieraan gewy. 
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A Psalm of Life 
Tell me not, in mournful numbers, 
Life is but an empty dream! 
For the soul is dead that slumbers, 
And things are not what they seem. 
Life is real! Life is earnest! 
And the grave is not its goal; 
Dust thou art, to dust returnest, 
Was not spoken of the soul. 
Not enjoyment, and not sorrow, 
Is our destined end or way; 
But to act, that each to-morrow 
Find us farther than to-day. 
Art is long, and Time is fleeting, 
And our hearts, though stout and brave, 
Still, like muffled drums, are beating 
Funeral marches to the grave. 
In the world's broad field of battle, 
In the bivouac of Life, 
Be not like dumb, driven cattle! 
Be a hero in the strife! 
Trust no Future, howe'er pleasant! 
Let the dead Past bury its dead! 
Act, - act in the living Present! 
Heart within, and God o'erhead! 
Lives of great men all remind us 
We can make our lives sublime, 
And, departing, leave behind us 
Footprints on the sands of time; 
Footprints, that perhaps another, 
Sailing o'er life's solemn main, 
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother, 
Seeing, shall take heart again. 
Let us, then, be up and doing, 
With a heart for any fate; 
Still achieving, still pursuing, 
Learn to labor and to wait 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS APPROACH TO AGRIBUSINESS IN 
DEVELOPMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN CASE STUDIES 
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This work is an endeavour into institutional economics and its application to 
contemporary economic and development issues in South Africa. The study begins by 
delving into the more popular New Institutional Economics literature. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, this leads to a greater appreciation for the insights that the Old 
Institutional economists generated in investigating the nature of institutions. Hence, 
the old institutional economics gains prominence in the latter part of this work, 
contrary to contemporary approaches followed in agricultural economics. Whereas the 
new institutional economics was found to be useful in yielding knowledge through 
analysis, the old institutional economics retains its advantage in promoting 
understanding of problems. This is critical in that it instils caution against 
reductionism and the search for quick-fix solutions to problems of an institutional 
nature. Instead, the approach strongly advanced in this work is one that advocates 
greater emphasis in institutional analysis on generating understanding of institutional 
problems to enhance the ability to manage such situations, as opposed to 'fixing' 
institutions as an intuitive response. 
The objective of the research is to show that institutions matter in shaping economic 
outcomes. That institutions matter is well acknowledged in economics and especially 
in institutional and behavioural economics. This research is aimed at affirming that 
institutions matter, and advances to establish, illustrate and examine 'how' they 
matter. It is postulated that this understanding advances and facilitates the design of 
more appropriate economic outcomes. It is more insightful than conventional neo 
classical approaches as it generates greater understanding of social and economic 
situations and inculcates more holistic and thoughtful responses. The use of 
institutional economics is not intended to refute the neo classical economics as some 
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institutional economists are often inclined to. It is rather considered as complimentary 
to neo classical economics and attends to critical shortfalls in this domain such as 
frictionless markets and perfect information. 
1.2 MOTIVATION AND THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS 
Institutions matter, especially when social and economic transformation is necessary. 
This position is central to this thesis. Institutions are in essence understood to be 
'collective action in control of individual action' as defined by John Commons (1934: 
69). This theoretical premise finds its home in the realm of institutional economics 
and in the tradition of the early institutionalists such as Thorstein Veblen and John 
Commons. Vink (1986), in motivating the need for an institutional approach, 
discussed the function and origin of institutions. Institutions are understood to 
supplement the market where the market cannot function, and in a world of imperfect 
information institutions carry information about the expected behaviour of other 
agents to better coordinate economic activity. In a market economy and given perfect 
information, such coordination would instead be directed by the price mechanism. 
Institutions are created: (i) by human design, (ii) through explicit bargaining, or (iii) 
by evolution. 
In defining the nature of his institutional economics, Commons identified some key 
features of the discourse that underpins much of the institutional approach. First, he 
argued that "conflict of issues", as opposed to "harmony" is the starting point of 
institutional economics. Second, he explains that "duty and debt" as opposed to 
"liberty and love" are the foundations of institutional economics. Third, he departed 
from the premise that "administration is more important than legislation" where 
"legislation furnished authorisation but administration is legislation in action". Lastly, 
"activity" as opposed to "pleasure and pain" is the focus of institutional economics 
(Commons, 1964: 52, 91, 97, 107). The works of Commons are well acknowledged to 
have inspired the subsequent work of the likes of Oliver Williamson and the parallels 
of the above premises with the three-tier analytical framework for the economics of 
institutions (i.e. embeddedness, governance and marginal conditions) put forward by 
Williamson (1999) are thus not incidental. The first two aspects raised by Commons 
relate well to Williamson's first tier of embeddedness and social capital. The third 
2 
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aspect relates to issues of the institutional environment and governance, which is 
Williamson's second tier. Lastly the focus on activity draws attention to marginal 
conditions and transactions, similar to Williamsons' third tier and his insistence on the 
transaction as the key unit of analysis in the new institutional economics and 
subsequent transaction cost economics literature. This approach also constitutes the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. 
The institutional approach to studying economic issues IS not considered a 
fundamental departure from the neoclassical paradigm. The neoclassical approach that 
treats individuals as sovereign is individualistic, rationalistic and utilitarian, and it can 
be credited for shaping economic thinking and analysis in a dominant way. This 
intuition remains critical to economics. However, its reliance on the market as the 
dominant mode of coordinating economic activity has become increasingly 
questioned because this is premised on static efficiency, instead of the more realistic 
dynamic efficiency (Liebenstein, 1976). Markets may therefore not be the only, or the 
most efficient form of coordinating economic activity. 
Markets do have merit in stimulating innovation, which remains a neglected aspect of 
A dam Smith's work, due to his preoccupations with the 'invisible hand'. Ronald 
Coase and Oliver Williamson, on the other hand began looking at inter- or intra-firm 
coordination to enhance efficiency, reduce transaction costs, and curtail opportunism. 
Alfred Chandler (1990) argued the merits and realities of intra-firm activity and the 
emergence of the modem corporation as a functional response to the demands of 
modem markets, technology and capital. Extending this debate into the integration 
and disintegration of the modem firm is an enticing prospect, but falls beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
The need for an institutional approach to studying economic issues is now well 
acknowledged, though other disciplines in the humanities can claim a better 
disposition towards institutions. Studies in the agricultural economics field in South 
Africa using an institutional approach commenced with the work of Vink (1986). 
Ortmann (200 1) provides an exposition of the new institutional economics applied to 
South African agriculture and supply chains 
3 
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Most studies are motivated by a general recognition of the role of institutions in 
framing economic outcomes and end up in the new institutional economics and 
subsequently transactions cost economics. This favouring of the transaction cost 
approach in the Williamson tradition has found appeal due to its ability to predict 
structural and organisational outcomes such as the efficient boundaries of firms, 
internal organisation, contractual relations, incentives, etc. Methodologically, it 
enables analysts to employ the empirical and mathematical rigour that has become a 
feature, and too often the purpose, of economic research. Again the danger of 
reductionism in the study of human economic behaviour looms as cautioned by the 
old institutional school. Hence the necessity for revisiting the old institutional 
economics and maintaining pliability in institutional inquiry. This inclination has 
influenced this thesis in two ways. First, it diverted the latter part of the work towards 
the old institutional economics and the role of social capital in shaping institutions and 
economic behaviour. Second, it reverts to theories on the nature of the firm that 
complements the transaction cost approach. The transaction costs approach is thus 
only used where it is found most effective in analysing vertical integration between 
firms and the relevant ex ante incentives and the ex post governance aspects 
(Williamson, 2003). 
Given uncertainty, institutions are the mechanisms used to structure human 
interactions. Institutions are the rules of the game of society and provide a framework 
of incentives that shape economic, political and social organisation. Institutions are 
composed of (i) formal rules (laws constitutions, rules), (ii) informal constraints 
(conventions, codes of conduct, norms of behaviour), and (iii) the effectiveness of 
their enforcement. Enforcement is carried out by third parties (law enforcement, social 
ostracism), second parties (retaliation), or by the first party (self-imposed codes of 
conduct). Institutions, like technology, are key in determining economic performance 
by influencing the cost of production, which includes input costs and transaction costs. 
Institutional analysis is mostly occupied with inter- and intra-institutional activity. 
However Demsetz (1997) argues that how firms function does not explain why firms 
exist. The origin of firms is as important in understanding institutions. It is to this 
aspect (i.e. the nature of the firm) that the latter part of the thesis shifts. In essence, the 
classical firm is a contractual structure with (1) joint input owners, (2) several output 
4 
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owners, (3) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs, (4) who 
has rights to appropriate any input's contract independently of contracts with other 
input owners, (5) who holds the residual claim, and (6) who has the right to sell its 
central contractual residual status. 
There are several explanations for the existence of firms: 
(i) Risk distribution. Firms exist due to the need to distribute risks and uncertainty 
efficiently among cooperating parties (Frank Knight). 
(ii) Transactions costs. Firms exist to economise on transaction costs i.e. when the 
costs of market coordination exceeds the cost of internal coordination (Ronald 
Coase). 
(iii) Opportunism. Firms exist to guard against opportunism or quasi rent seeking 
(Oliver Williamson). 
(iv) Specialisation. Firms exist because production is more efficient when done by 
specialised units that offer greater consumption utility. 
(v) Technological separability. The boundaries of firms are likely to be 
determined by the extent of bulky technological inputs i.e. asset specificity 
(Oliver Williamson). 
(vi) Incomplete contracts. Firms arise when people write contracts that are essentially 
incomplete due to bounded rationality, and non-verifiability of variables. The 
allocation of power and control thus become necessary (Oliver Hart). 
(vii) Property rights. Firms are established to ensure ownership and the residual 
rights that accompany such ownership and equity. 
(viii) Power. Firms confer ownership, which is a source of power when contracts 
are incomplete. 
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(ix) Monitoring labour effort. Firms exist as long as those with the residual rights 
they are superior in monitoring effort contributions i.e. guarding against 
shirking behaviour (Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz). 
(x) Economising on inputs. Firms are a form of centralised monitoring over 
efficient production (Y oram Barzel). 
(xi) Engagement between ownership and control. Modern firms are sustained as 
optimal forms of engagement between control by specialised managers with 
tacit knowledge, and ownership by those with the residual claims (Fama and 
Jensen). 
(xii) Bounded rationality. Firms enforce structural limits on entrepreneurs who 
understand that they operate under risk and uncertainty that stem from 
limitations on human rationality (Herbert Simon). 
(xiii) Administrative Unit. A firm is an administrative unit that can extend over time 
in pace with the internal dynamics of the firm (Penrose). 
Understanding the purpose for the existence of institutions like firms, essential in 
gaining insight into their functioning and behaviour. Such understanding is valuable 
in institutional analysis and planning interventions to effect positive c~hange in 
behaviour and economic outcomes. 
1.3 KEY THEMES 
The thesis also embodies certain key thematic propositions that are considered as 
integral to institutional analysis and an understanding of the nature of institutions. 
Each of these is intended to show that 'institutions matter', and refer to the following: 
Social capital matters. Social capital and institutional embeddedness formed over a 
lengthy period are critical in shaping the nature of institutions and its parameters in 
the longer term. In addition it tends to be a valuable and often latent resource that is 
necessary to sustain and safeguard relations and transactions in an attempt to retain 
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THE ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS 
Level Purpose Theory 
Levell Embeddedness: Protection, preservation, Social theory 
(Informal institutions, power 
traditions, norms, religion, 
culture, socio-political 
imperatives, etc.) 
Level2 Institutional environment: First order economising: Economics of property 
Formal rules of game: Get the institutional rights 
(property rights, laws, environment right Positive political theory 
constitutions, etc.) 
Level3 Governance: Second order economising: Transaction cost economics 
Play of the game: Get the governance 
(aligning governance structure right 
structures with transactions) 
Level4 Neoclassical analysis: Third order economising: Neoclassical economics 
Performance: Get the marginal Agency theory 
(optimality, prices, conditions right 
quantities, incentives, etc.) 
1.4 COMPOSITION OF CHAPTERS 
The thesis is a compilation of papers that were drafted, published or delivered at appropriate 
scientific meetings. Each paper hence constitutes a chapter and set out as follows: 
(i) The New Institutional Economics and Agribusiness Development: Theoretical 
Approaches to Development Challenges (2002). Invited paper delivered at the 
annual conference of the Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa, 
Bloemfontein. 
(ii) Bridging The Small-Big Divide: A Transaction Cost Approach to Enterprise 
Modelling For Mussel Mariculture in Saldanha Bay (1999). Paper published in 
Agrekon 
(iii) Appraising the Prospects of Contract Farming in Oyster Production in South 
Africa (2000). Paper delivered at the annual conference of the Agricultural 
Economics Association of South Africa, Langebaan. 1 
1 Paper (ii) and (iii) were combined in a paper entitled: Transactions Costs in Contract Farming Models 
for Mussel and Oyster Farming in South Africa. Organisational and Management Implications (2001). 
Paper was published in the International Journal of Aquaculture Economics and Management. 
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(iv) A New Institutional Economic Analysis of Large Fresh Produce Markets: 
Implications for formal and informal sectors under changing market conditions 
(2000). Unpublished paper. 
(v) An Institutional Economic Appraisal of Worker Equity Schemes in Agriculture: 
The Incomplete Contracts Approach to the Separation of Ownership and Control 
(2003). Paper delivered at the annual conference of the Agricultural Economics 
Association of South Africa, Drakensberg. 
Chapter I serves as an Introduction and Chapter 7 serves as a Conclusion. 
1.5 MOTIVATION OF CHAPTERS 
The sequence of chapters comprising this thesis follows the Commons-Williamson 
approach to the economics of institutions outlined above. Chapter 2 is intended to 
provide the theoretical basis of the thesis, drawing together different theories to 
compose the broad theoretical framework. Further refinements, detail and applications 
are made in later chapters. 
Chapters 3 and 4 departs from the proposition that transactions costs are significant, 
that transaction costs influence the marginal conditions facing the firm, and that 
transaction costs affect the nature of the firm. The chapters are inspired by the 
theoretical positions ofWilliamson (1975; 1986; 1991; 1999) and by Binswanger and 
Rosensweig ( 1985) as well as the transaction costs analytical methods and 
applications of Delgado (1998), and Key and Rungsten (1999). The contributions of 
these chapters are essentially threefold. First, they apply the frameworks to new 
industries (mussels and oysters). Second, transaction costs are identified extensively. 
Third, they elicit institutional design responses to promote more efficient and 
competitive firms. Essentially these chapters deal with the 'Governance' and 
'Marginal Conditions' levels in Institutional Economics described earlier. 
Chapter 3 is applied to mussel farming where the existence of large firms is contrary 
to the neo classical intuition that favours efficiency and utility maximisation criteria. 
This is in the context of established efficiency gains of small growers. The 
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explanation lies in the existence of transaction costs that are identified, and that 
impedes market interaction. Alternatives are then offered that addresses the 
transactions costs incrementally and allows for the capitalising on the efficiency gains 
of smaller firms through contracting. Chapter 4 is closely related to chapter 3 and 
applied to oyster farming. Contract farming is proposed as a suitable enterprise form. 
The analysis is aimed at identifying the imperfections associated with this industry 
and enterprise form. The purpose is to design an enabling contracting arrangement. 
Chapters 2 and 3 hence deal essentially with transaction costs and organisational 
design. The necessity to move beyond the transaction cost approach is acknowledged 
and stems initially from the early critiques of profit maximisation by Herbert Simon 
(bounded rationality) Harvey Liebenstein (X-efficiency) and Alchain and Demsetz 
(Demsetz, 1997). This is well documented by Dietrich (1994 ). The last two chapters 
deal more with the 'Embeddedness and Social Capital' levels in Institutional 
Economics as proposed by Williamson (1999) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997). 
The necessity of this level of analysis, in this thesis, was realised after the application 
of Transaction Cost Economics, questioning the existence of transaction costs and the 
ex post governance structures. 
Chapter 5 and 6 attends to the first and second tier of analysing institutions of 
Williamson referred to earlier. Chapter 5 is applied to large fresh produce markets and 
involves an institutional economic analysis is conducted to identify the factors 
inducing institutional change and to show how these bring about maladaptation 
manifested in transaction costs. These costs stem mainly from institutional 
embeddedness, opportunism, and asset specificity, which resulted in bureaucratic 
costs, moral hazard, rent seeking, adverse selection, prisoners' dilemma, and a lack of 
credible commitments. The identified transaction costs aspects are subsequently used 
in proposing more appropriate governance structures. 
Chapter 6 is much focused in the Williamson's first tier and applied to worker equity 
schemes observed in commercial agriculture. The analysis is aimed at identifying 
institutional incompleteness that stem from the lack of verifiability related to social 
capital, embeddedness, governance and micro performance. The analysis leads to the 
incentives and innovations required to make equity schemes, as a type of shareholder 
11 
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contract, more complete and credible in an economic empowerment context in South 
Africa. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND AGRIBUSINESS 
DEVELOPMENT: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT 
CHALLENGES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Economic development efforts in agribusiness have much to gain from the theories 
and approaches related to the New Institutional Economics (NIE). Much of the 
analysis in agribusiness or the development field favours a departure from the Coase 
theorem (193 7) towards Williamsonian transaction cost analysis. This departure is 
also the case in South Africa where the economic environment is rife with transaction 
costs and institutional complexity. This approach often leads to the correct 
identification of transaction costs within the confines of bounded rationality, 
information asymmetry, opportunism and asset specificity (Williamson 1975, 1985) 
and moves on to corrective measures. 
This chapter goes beyond this approach by probing into the causes of transaction 
costs, which by Williamsons' own acknowledgment often emanate from the 
institutional environment that is shaped by embeddedness and social capital. The 
latter has been traditionally the preoccupation of social scientists, but social capital 
has become increasingly important in institutional economic analysis. It is especially 
the old institutional economists, who retained a key interest in this area, to whom this 
institutional intuition can be attributed. The central proposition in this chapter is that 
institutions, as shaped by embeddedness and social capital, matter in determining the 
economic performance of firms, markets and economies. Much attention is 
subsequently devoted to understanding social capital and eliciting implications for 
economic development. 
The paper commences with an overview of institutions in economics by identifying 
what institutions are and outlining their Coasian premise. The old and new 
institutional economics are then contrasted to illustrate the merits of staying in touch 
with the old institutional tradition that continuously reinforces and expands the field 
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of institutional economics. Its ability to better deal with social capital is a particular 
case in point. This discussion ends with some remarks around institutional analysis 
where the role of social capital and embeddedness is acknowledged. The next section 
deals with transaction cost economics, where the purpose is to identify the theoretical 
shortcomings of this theory with a view to moving beyond transaction cost analysis. 
This discussion then leads to the key emphasis of this paper i.e. Social Capital. 
Finally, the theoretical frameworks are used to elicit implications for economic 
development and empowerment efforts in agribusiness in South Africa. 
2.2 INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMICS 
2.2.1 What are Institutions? 
As shown in Chapter 1, institutions are the mechanisms used to structure human 
interactions in the face of uncertainty. Institutions are the rules of the game of society 
and provide a framework of incentives that shape economic, political and social 
organisation. Institutions are composed of (i) formal rules (laws, constitutions, rules), 
(ii) informal constraints (conventions, codes of conduct, norms of behaviour), and 
(iii) the effectiveness of their enforcement. Enforcement is carried out by third parties 
(law enforcement, social ostracism), second parties (retaliation), or by the first party 
(self-imposed codes of conduct). Institutions, like technology, are key in determining 
economic performance by influencing the cost of production, which includes input 
costs and transaction costs. 
2.2.2 Neoclassical and Marxist Limitations and Ronald Coase 
Neoclassical economics is concerned with the workings of markets based on certain 
premises such as perfect information, homogenous products, ease of entry, and zero 
transaction costs, etc. Neoclassical theory survived due to its uncompromising 
attention on scarcity, individuals and competition as prerequisites for economic 
activity. The theory is however, rather static, as it does not address issues of how 
markets have evolved. The introduction of historical tradition into economic theory, 
which then induced dynamism into the theory, is largely found in the contributions of 
Douglas North, inter alia. Douglas North on the other hand was concerned about the 
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transaction costs that determined overall economic performance. Early works in 
institutional economics by the likes ofThorstein Veblen and John Commons provided 
valuable insights into institutions and instilled critical thinking around institutions and 
economics. However, they failed to provide clear theoretical frameworks that could be 
used in institutional economic analysis. 
Similarly, while Marxist theories were primarily concerned with economic institutions 
and provided valuable critique, they never posed a serious alternative to neoclassical 
theory. Its limitations of Marxism include making the amorphous concept of class the 
unit of analysis, whereas the NIE uses the transaction as the unit of analysis. 
Ronald Coase, first addressed the neoclassical shortcomings and subsequent failure to 
explain economic performance over time and under different institutional contexts, in 
his seminal 193 7 paper on 'The Nature of the Firm'. Coase addressed the issue of the 
cost of economic organisation and the transaction costs, which determine the 
existence of firms. Coase's next important contribution came in 1960 with his paper 
'The Problem of Social Cost' where he was able to connect neoclassical theory to 
institutional analysis. He concluded that when transaction costs were positive, 
institutions mattered and determined the subsequent market structure. 
2.2.3 The Old Institutional Economics (OIE) 
The old institutionalism is commonly associated with the works of John Commons, 
Clarence Ayres, Wesley Mitchell, Thorstein Veblen, and more recently Alan Gruchy 
(Rutherford, 1996). The OIE does not represent a single unified or well-defined body 
of thought, method or line of research. It however embodies two main ideas. The first 
is associated mainly with Thorstein Veblen and generally addresses the effects of new 
technology on institutional schemes, and the extent to which established social 
conventions and vested interest react to such change. The second stream is mainly 
associated with the works of John Commons and more recently represented in works 
of Warren Samuels and Allan Schmid (Samuels and Schmid, 1981). Their research 
focuses on law, property rights, and organisations. Institutions are considered the 
outcome of formal and informal processes of conflict resolution, the criteria of 
success being whether the institution has generated a 'reasonable value' or 'workable 
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mutuality' out of conflict (Rutherford, 1996). The second stream is closer to the NIE, 
but despite the complementarities differs significantly. 
The OIE differs from the NIE in its cynicism about markets and the supremacy of 
individual preference, and favours government intervention and public scrutiny of 
private endeavours. Markets are viewed suspiciously for their tendency to create 
inequities in income, welfare, power, and economic opportunity. It is wary of the 
subsequent manipulations in markets, consumer behaviour, and technology, amongst 
others. Old institutionalists appear convinced of the power of institutions to mould 
individual aims and ideals and thus reject orthodox individualism. With OIE there is 
also a rejection of formal methods of analysis, favouring holistic approaches based on 
value judgements around issues such as equity and social justice. The OIE also rejects 
rational choice approaches. Old institutionalists consider the NIE too formal and 
abstract, and a theory that is too reductionist, individualistic, rational choice oriented, 
ignoring welfare criteria in appraisals, trusting of markets, and anti-interventionist 
(Langlois, 1986, 1989). The dispute between the OIE and the NIE centres on: (i) 
formal vs. non-formal methods; (ii) institutions as an outcome of individual action or 
vice versa; (iii) rationalism; (iv) invisible hand vs deliberate design outcomes; and (v) 
the appropriate role of government. 
2.2.4 The New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
The NIE grew from the OIE due to a frustration with its lack of theory, its 
preoccupation with holistic as opposed to individualistic tendencies, behaviouristic as 
opposed to rational choice approaches, and a failure to accept unintended and 
evolutionary processes in institutional development. The OIE is considered too 
descriptive, anti-formalist, holist, behaviourist, and collectivist (Rutherford, 1996). 
The NIE has developed into several strands as outlined by Cook and Chaddad (2000) 
and Rutherford (1996). These include a property rights strand (Aichian and Demsetz, 
1973), public choice (Olsen, 1982), organisation and agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), and transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Generally, the new 
institutionalism can be divided into a neoclassical and an Austrian-cum-
Schumpeterian branch. A consistent clamouring exists to move away from the neo-
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classical core to an Austrian tradition where the focus is more on the spontaneous 
development of institutions out of individual action. 
2.2.5 Institutional Analysis 
ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS 
LEVEL 
L1 
EMBEDDEDNESS 
INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS, 
TRADITIONS, 
NORMS, 
RELIGION 
FREQUENCY 
(YEARS) 
100 TO 1000 
PURPOSE 
OFTEN NONCALCULA TIVE 
SPONT AN EO US 
............. f.. .................................. l··········"·"·· ................................................................................  
L2 
L3 
L4 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT: 
FORMAL RULES OF 
THE GAME- ESP, 
PROPERTY (POLITY, 
JUDICIARY, 
BUREAUCRACY) 
i 
GOVERNANCE: 
PLAY OF THE GAME 
-ESP. CONTRACT 
(ALIGNING 
GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES WITH 
TRANSACTIONS) 
·········i·······················l·· 
RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT 
(PRICES AND 
QUANTITIES; 
INCENTIVE 
ALIGNMENT) 
L1: SOCIAL THEORY 
10 TO 100 
1 TO 10 
CONTINUOUS 
L2: ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PPT 
L3: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
L4: NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS/AGENCY THEORY 
Source: Williamson, 1999. 
Figure 2.1: Economics oflnstitutions 
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Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The economics of institutions is often analysed in terms of marginal conditions 
(neoclassical economics) or transaction costs. There can be a real danger however, 
that this type of analysis could fall into the reductionism trap that the NIE often faces. 
Hence, it is important to retain what one may call an 'old institutional intuition'. The 
purpose is to avoid analysing economic effects (e.g. transactions costs, governance) 
without looking into the causes of such occurrences. Williamson concedes that the 
domain of the NIE (i.e. the Institutional environment and Governance) often operates 
under constraint of embeddedness. He thus proposes four levels of analysis, as 
depicted in Figure 2.1 above. Level 1 is associated with social theory, Level 2 and 3 
with the NIE and Level 4 with neoclassical economics. Most advances in economics 
have been made in Levels 2, 3 and 4, and relatively little in Level 1. This also 
resembles the situation in South Africa and the purpose if this paper is also to open 
the debate on the implications of Level 1 in economic development and theory. 
The following section deals with transaction cost economics (TCE). The underlying 
theory is briefly explained and a critique offered to illustrate the need to move beyond 
TCE. The purpose is to show that much ofthe shortcomings of the theory, though not 
serious, necessitate a look into the area of social capital and embeddedness to gain a 
fuller insight into institutional performance. 
2.3 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) 
This section does not elaborate on what TCE but is rather intended to take a critical 
look at the theory. It begins briefly with the initial theoretical constructs of Coase and 
Williamson and elaborates on their shortcomings in fully explaining institutional 
performance. 
2.3.1 The Coase Theory 
It is commonly held that TCE commenced with Coase's (1937) observations that 'the 
main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a 
cost of using the price mechanism'. Put differently, if the price mechanism can 
effectively allocate resources why should resource allocation be planned within firms? 
Coase did not use the term transaction costs first (the term is attributed to Arrow), but 
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expanded on this concept in his 1960 paper on 'the Problem of Social Cost'. The 
Coase theory has since been subjected to considerable scrutiny and some 
shortcomings have been identified. 
2.3.2 Critique 
Dietrich (1994) identifies a number of theoretical problems with Coases advances on 
the Nature of the Firm. First, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) claimed that Coase's 
analysis is tautological, because suggesting that firms exists due to the relative costs 
of using the market mechanism could also imply that markets exist due to the relative 
costs of management. This reasoning simply leaves too much to be explained by 
transaction costs. Second, his analysis suggests that firms may substitute for markets, 
which fails to recognise the essential role of the firm as the management of a 
production distribution process (Fourie, 1989), especially in vertically integrated 
firms. Hence to claim that firms replaced markets implies that markets can exist in the 
absence of firms. Simon (1988 in Best 1990) broke with the neoclassical and 
Williamson tradition, as he does not explain firms in terms of markets, but markets in 
terms of firms. His contribution lies in his insistence that the firm is more than simply 
centralized authority, but a means of establishing enabling rules and rules of authority 
to encourage individual responsibility and gain from collective action. Third, the 
application of the theory to one-person firms is problematic. Last, the theory suggests 
that the firm can always revert to the markets when it itself fails to produce at lower 
cost. The problem here is that the market may not always be able to provide at lower 
cost, if at all. Nevertheless, while the above critique is fundamental it is not 
considered serious enough to completely negate the Coase theory. 
Dietrich (1994) provides an elaborate critique of TCE. This critique stems from the 
assumptions around opportunism and the links between contracting costs and 
production costs. His critique can be summarised as follows: 
(i) TCE considers the firm 'a lower cost producer' but ignores its fundamental role 
as a production-distribution unit and hence cannot sufficiently explain the 
existence of firms. 
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(ii) TCE assumed that market based resource allocation is possible, which need 
not be the case. 
(iii) The centrality of opportunism is questionable. 
(iv) TCE largely favours comparative static analysis whilst proper institutional 
analysis requires a dynamic perspective of evolving organisations. 
(v) The tendency of institutions to evolve towards greater power as opposed to 
enhanced efficiency. 
(vi) Limitations in the Williamson M-form representation of firms, especially for 
modem corporations. 
(vii) The importance of introducing competitive dynamics with space for proactive 
learning behaviour. 
(viii) Firms are also the embodiment of socio-political-cultural factors that 
endogenise aspirations and organisational routines. 
The above critique, though important, serves to strengthen the theory and points 
towards integration with complimentary theories. In particular it calls for 
reconsideration around the evolutionary theory of the firm in the Schumpeter 
tradition, and for greater recognition of the role of social capital and institutional 
embeddedness. It is to the latter that this discussion now turns. 
2.4 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The nature, existence and functioning of institution are much related to the social 
context in which institutions exist. The importance of social theory in institutional 
analysis was acknowledged in section 2.5. The social context often impact on 
institutions in form of social capital, which calls for greater attention on social capital 
in institutional economics. 
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2.4.1 What is Social Capital? 
Social capital refers to the features of social organization such as trust, norms, and 
networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions (Putnam, 1993). It can be considered as 'moral resources' that increases with 
use and depletes when not used, which means that it can have virtuous or vicious 
cycles. Social capital is a public good as opposed to conventional capital which is a 
private good. It often gets produced as a by-product of other social activities. Trust 
arises out of two related sources: (i) norms of reciprocity, and (ii) networks of civic 
engagement (Putnam 1993). Societies with productive norms of reciprocity (i.e. dense 
networks of social exchange) are more efficient in constraining opportunism and 
resolving problems of collective action. Networks of exchange/engagement can be 
formal or informal, vertical or horizontal. These networks (clubs, societies, 
associations etc.) can be intense horizontal forms of engagement that can be a vital 
source of social capital in the following ways: (i) they increase the cost to defectors in 
prisoner's dilemma situations, they (ii) foster robust forms of reciprocity or acceptable 
behaviour, they (iii) improve information flows about trustworthiness, and they (iv) 
provide a template for continued engagement based on past successes. On the 
contrary, vertical networks cannot sustain trust and cooperation irrespective of its 
density. Here information flows are less reliable since subordinates hog information 
as a hedge against exploitation. It is also difficult to impose sanctions against 
opportunism. Such measures are less likely to be imposed upwards and more likely 
downwards. Granovetter (1985) claims that weak social ties (e.g. acquaintance and 
referrals) are however better at linking different social groups than strong ties (e.g. 
kinship, friendships). This implies that weak ties are important in forging business 
relations and initial transactions, often due to the false comforts brought by bounded 
rationality and information asymmetries. 
2.4.2 Individualist vs Collective Societies 
Anthropologists and social psychologists have always recognised the key role that 
culture, traditions, religion and the aggregate social context plays in people's 
behaviour and choices. This however was never adequately (if ever) integrated into 
economic analysis. Scholars like A vner Greif have produced some groundbreaking 
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concerned with technological lock-in whereby inferior products become established in 
the market by virtue of historical disposition. Something similar could be said of 
'institutional lock-in'. Also Huntington (1996) has provided a still controversial 
advance on macro socio-political path dependence of civilizations, which remains 
difficult to ignore. 
Greif (1997) mentions three factors that make institutional structures path dependent. 
First, economic institutions are composed of cultural beliefs and organisations that are 
interrelated. Second, organisational development by itself is a historical process 
whereby past organisations determine future institutional and organisational 
development. Third, past institutions impact on the development of values and social 
enforcement mechanisms that inhibits flexibility in departing from past patterns of 
behaviour. Once again it is notable that collectivist societies resemble the developing 
world, whereas individualist societies resemble the western world. However, many 
countries today have become mixed in that enclaves of collectivist or individualist 
communities are found in each. These societies are interacting economically and 
socially to a much greater extent than in the past. The formation of hybrid institutional 
structures can therefore be expected, even though this aspect has not received much 
academic attention. The institutions evolving at the interface between these two 
societies may also be path dependent and would present a fascinating challenge for 
further institutional evolutionary analysis. 
Markets are embedded in webs of social relationships (Granovetter, 1985). Extensive 
work on social capital and embeddedness and the implied path dependency in Africa 
is found in the work of Fafchamps (1999). Like Braudel (1986), he states three means 
of resource allocation: (i) gift exchange (subsistence), (ii) markets, and (iii) command 
and control (capitalist). In Africa, he found that gift exchange plays the most 
important role in allocation of subsistence goods. In developed economies command 
and control dominates the allocation in large corporations and public agencies. Hence 
in Africa markets are the primary allocation mechanism after gift exchange, whilst 
hierarchies dominate capitalist economies (Fafchamps, 1999). In Africa hierarchies 
are small (except the state), which limits its reliance on the judiciary. Often the large 
informal economy in Africa is associated with high transaction costs, which are best 
dealt with through long term trading relationships like relational contracting. 
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Relational contracting and its ability to deter cheating were demonstrated by 
Granovetter (1995) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Subsequently, relationships 
become their own collateral (Kranton, 1996). Networks of relationships shape market 
exchange, facilitate market entry, check opportunism, and serve as a referral system. 
Networks however bring certain externalities like nepotism and insularity, which limit 
productivity growth in its attempt to perpetuate itself like prosperous communities do. 
Barr (2000) and Fafchamps and Minten (1998) provide evidence of networks and 
related effects in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fafchamps (1999) argues for network renewal 
by cooptation that requires network screening and effective referrals. He further plays 
down the role of ethnicity, family and religion in sustaining networks and finds that 
for the most part, networks result from frequent business interactions. 
2.4.4 Enforcement 
As stated earlier, enforcement is considered a third dimension of institutions. Four 
levels of enforcement can be distinguished. First is values-based individual self-
enforcement where principals contract with agents whose value systems (religion, 
ethics) are strong enough to prevent opportunism or default. Second is second party 
enforcement where principals contract with agents based on the principal's ability to 
enforce the contract through for example hierarchy, reciprocity or future 
commitments. Third, is third party informal enforcement where the principal will 
contract with an agent based in the principal's ability to enforce the contract through 
peer pressure or community ostracism. Fourth is third party enforcement through state 
assistance via the judiciary and government policing. 
In collectivist societies, contract enforcement is achieved mainly through informal 
economic and social institutions. Here, cultural beliefs support an economic self-
enforcing collective punishment. Improper opportunism is curtailed by a credible 
threat of collective economic punishment that could also be detrimental socially. This 
is made possible through an extensive and active social network built on kinship and 
reciprocity. In individualist societies cultural beliefs bring a reliance on second party 
enforcement supported by formal third party enforcement. There is little informal 
economic enforcement or self-enforcing collective punishment due to low reliance on 
kinship and networks for information transmission. Here, a legal system based on 
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state authority is essential to enforce contractual obligations and mitigate free-rider 
problems and opportunism (Greif 1997). 
2.4.5 Embedded Autonomy 
The East Asian examples of economic success bring forth the issue of embedded 
autonomy as advanced by Evans (1995). Embedded autonomy refers to the insular 
network of a bureaucratic elite in charge of policy making and can also be considered 
as the political economy of the developmental state. This insulation Evans regards as 
the key to success of the East Asian states. Bardhan (2000) however cautions against 
the Olson-type collective action problems like 'prisoners' dilemma' and difficulties in 
formulating clear and cohesive goals, especially in heterogeneous societies. Further, 
such insulation may bring efficiency losses associated with the lack of accountability, 
inadequate localized information, dealing with changes in market and technological 
conditions, and reduced risk-taking, all of which ultimately affect long-term economic 
performance. Nonetheless, embedded autonomy is acknowledged as an important 
source of social capital with proven merit in economic development spearheaded by a 
developmental state and reinforced by informal yet insular peer relations among the 
elite. In a sense it is the marriage of an 'encompassing interest' with personal gain. 
2.4.6 Agency I Hierarchy 
Agency relations in collectivist societies tend to be horizontal, with traders serving as 
agents for several merchants and vice versa. There is little evidence that social class 
based on wealth and heritage dictates agent relations and inducing hierarchy. On the 
contrary, agent relations in individualist societies tend to be vertical, based on wealth 
and class, which inevitably lead to an increasingly skewed wealth distribution and 
social disparity (Greif 1997). 
2.4. 7 Ownership and Control 
The historical analysis of Greif (1997) provides further insight into the evolution of 
the firm in collectivist and individualist societies respectively. In both societies the 
family firm was initially relied upon as it served to reduce transaction costs. However, 
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the further historical development differs starkly. In collectivist societies there is little 
incentive to introduce an organisational form that reduces the likelihood of forced 
separations between ownership and control. In individualist societies individual firms 
became family firms, but family members became replaced by external investors 
eventually, and equity thus became tradable. This meant a separation of ownership 
and control, which required appropriate institutions to surmount contractual problems 
and improvement in information transmission techniques and accounting procedures. 
2.4.8 Trust 
Trust is defined as 'a threshold point on a probabilistic distribution' Gambetta (1988). 
It is a type of expectation needed to cover for vulnerability (Barr, 2001 ). Trust entails 
a prediction about the behaviour of an independent actor and is an important 
component of social capital (Putnam, 1993). Its role in trade relationships is well 
acknowledged (Fukuyama, 1995 and Gambetta, 1988). Ethnicity, religion and cultural 
aspects are often understood to foster and sustain trust. However recent evidence 
suggests that trust is not absolute, since it is fostered by repeated interactions (Barr, 
2001, Masuku et al, 2002). Aspects like ethnicity and familial relations are but 
starting points but cannot sustain trust. Granovetter ( 1985) states that 'trust is 
generated and malfeasance discouraged when agreements are embedded in a larger 
structure of personal relations and social networks. 
2.5 IMPLICATIONS IN A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
A central premise of this paper is that institutional economic theory provides valuable 
insights and can make useful contributions in addressing developmental challenges. In 
this section, the preceding theories are applied to some key economic development 
challenges in South Africa. 
2.5.1 Constructive Engagement 
Given that social capital can be either vicious or virtuous it becomes paramount that 
economic planning be aimed at creating a virtuous environment. 'Friendly planet' 
versus 'Gilded cage' scenarios are for example, well explicated by Sunter and 
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Hill bury (200 1) in their discussions around global scenarios. This follows in the 
tradition of Sunter's earlier works on 'High-road' and 'Low road' scenarios for South 
Africa in the late 1980's. They generally argue that the tendency of the world's rich to 
disengage from the poor by ceasing dialogue and similarly divestment, insularity, and 
the like, would ultimately lead to disastrous outcomes. It is interesting that in this 
context they presented scenarios that included terrorist attacks on western cities only a 
few months before September 11, 2001. The scenario follows in the vein of 
Huntington (1996). This threat holds equally for South Africa, given the prevailing 
socio-economic dualism. Recent occurrences in Zimbabwe around land reform, when 
considered in this context, also raise questions as to whether in that country the rich 
constructively engaged with issues of poverty, deprivation, restitution and sustainable 
economic growth. There are thus ominous overtures in the insistence by Douglas 
North and others that in the development of economies and institutions 'history 
matters'. Therefore rural and agribusiness development must occur within the context 
of constructive engagement between the privileged and disadvantaged. 
2.5.2 Remediableness 
The requisite economic engagement referred to above has to take cognisance of 
Williamson's proposition of 'remediableness'. Here, social and economic constructs 
are accepted as less than optimal (sequential), since the emphasis is on constructs that 
are suitable. This position stems from his fundamental assumption of bounded 
rationality. An acceptance of the remediableness principle creates the required space 
and encouragement for the emergence and proliferation of various models of 
economic engagement. It embraces imperfections and failure in the ultimate pursuit of 
sustainable economic institutions. It further induces Schumpeterian constructive 
dynamism, which is essential for the positive evolution of institutions and the creation 
of workable outcomes. Once an 'encompassing interest' is created and 'credible 
commitments' forged, remediableness becomes the public good (social capital) that 
brings tolerance and space for experimentation with models of constructive 
engagement. In essence, it means that any social or economic construct must be 
accepted as imperfect and can be incrementally improved as better information is 
generated or emerge in the process. Another implication is the emphasis placed in 
credible processes as opposed to idealized and perfect outcomes. 
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2.5.3 Models 
Building and pursuing economic models of engagement have historically often been 
pursued in a myopic and dogmatic fashion e.g. collective farms, contract farming, 
sharecropping, worker equity schemes. In South Africa this danger looms too, 
considering the implied forced-collectivisation of the land reform programme and the 
emergence/preoccupation with equity share schemes. Again the adoption of 
remediableness creates the space for present day innovations of constructive 
engagement. This allowance for economic experimentation and incubation (if 
properly incentivised) can unleash an entrepreneurial vigour, which is critical for 
economic growth. Embracing failure, as individualistic societies do, would serve to 
reduce the fear of risks and transaction costs, which so often impedes economic 
development. However, there is a real and present risk of opportunism by those who 
only seek imminent gain without committing to long-term sustainable economic 
development. Olson (1982) discussed the manner in which rent-seeking by small 
powerful interest groups can weaken economic outcomes. Monitoring costs therefore 
have to be incurred both ex ante and ex post. It further requires some kind of 
economic compact between the public and private sectors avoid capital and 
entrepreneurial flight due to experimental failure and opportunistic behaviour. This 
may create the embedded autonomy propositioned by Evans (1995) as necessary for 
economic development and equates to the 'encompassing interest' that Olson (1982) 
advocates in the pursuit of productivity and equity gains for society. 
The separation of ownership and control is a subject afforded much attention m 
economics literature, but which finds greater application outside of agriculture. The 
industrialization of agriculture and the increased cost of land have perhaps reopened 
the debate in agriculture. Equity schemes as a means of worker empowerment are 
relevant in this context and a few observations can be made. First, they can be seen as 
a means of constructive engagement, but with much space for opportunism given 
human and information asymmetries. Second, in the absence of effective ex post 
monitoring systems, opportunism will inevitably manifest given the dire lack of social 
capital. Third, the model is vulnerable to (Olson-type) collective action problems. 
Fourth, there seems little 'incentive to alter' (Bardhan) the model, so that 
entrepreneurial internal dynamism drives economic performance. Fifth, government 
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agencies responsible for supporting the model employ individuals with 'low-powered 
incentives' (Williamson) to ensure that the model works once supported. 
Subsequently, the model suffers from poor financial performance, worker frustrations, 
and increased dissatisfaction (Karaan, 2002, Tregurtha and Karaan, 2001 ). The 
problems experienced can be summarized as a combination of a lack of internal 
dynamism, covert opportunism, collective action problems and generally incomplete 
design. The latter specifically refers to the inclusion of high-powered incentives that 
encourage entrepreneurship and the problem of missing markets. The most important 
missing market is the market for empowerment equity, which once created in the firm, 
can hardly be traded in the open (or concessionary) market. This is an area that 
development finance institutions have to pay attention to. 
Economic models other than equity schemes, contract farming and subsistence 
farming have rarely surfaced in the South African land reform programme. A myriad 
of contract models are possible and need greater experimentation. Again, however, 
contract monitoring is necessary in the face of opportunism and asymmetries. A key 
challenge is how best to combine the collectivist and individualist traits in enterprises 
to ensure positive path dependency. For the time being it is important to withhold 
judgment and encourage risk-taking. 
Empowerment models can be assessed in terms ofthe creation of physical and human 
capital. This is again used in addressing the fundamental economic problem of 
unlimited human needs and limited resources which encourages trade. The litmus test 
for economic empowerment is therefore whether an asset is created that can be traded 
in the open economy. In the likely event of missing markets, discretionary markets 
can be created, not in parallel but rather to be eventually integrated into mainstream 
markets once market failure is dealt with effectively. Most agricultural empowerment 
models seem to have failed this test thus far. 
2.5.4 Land Reform 
The necessity and intricacies of land reform have been well presented by Binswanger, 
Deininger and Feder (1995), encapsulated in their title 'Power Distortions, Revolt and 
Reform in Agricultural Land Relations'. North (1991) has shown extensively that 
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property rights and the structure of institutions follow the relative bargaining positions 
of social groups and their prevailing material conditions. North (1991) as well as 
Hayami and Ruttan (1985) have provided several examples of these. However, the old 
institutionalists appear to be more aware of the hindrances that can be caused by the 
vested interests of powerful groups in the face of perceived losses. Under such 
circumstances of necessary change perceived as threatening by powerful groups, 
Olson (1972) identifies certain collective action problems. First is a case where the 
losses of the potential losers are concentrated and apparent and the gains of the 
potential gainers diffused. This leads to skewed bargaining positions that often render 
inequitable outcomes leading to further bargaining and conflicts. Olson also suggests 
that collective action problems are exacerbated when societies are more 
heterogeneous. Bardhan (2000) argues that heterogeneity, collective action problems 
and public bureaucracies bring further complications, especially since it is difficult 
under these circumstances to devise high-powered incentives for public officials. He 
mentions the common agency problem (i.e. the civil servants have to serve multiple 
agents) and the multiple task problem (i.e. the civil servants have to pursue multiple 
goals). Consequently, civil servants are prone to be captured by interest groups and 
also tend to build elaborate checks and balances that ultimately retard change. The 
above issues serve to elucidate that some of the problems experienced with land 
reform in South Africa are not uncommon and stem from the prevailing institutional 
peculiarities ofthe country. 
In this context, some observations are possible. Firstly land reform will not cease until 
greater social justice is achieved, despite its lack of pace and direction. Secondly, the 
process is always prone to opportunism by powerful groups like both white and black 
elites potentially have most to lose or gain respectively. Public bureaucracy is and 
continues to have every potential to retard progress. Thus market-assisted mechanisms 
are required to induce efficiency on condition that the agents and monitors can all be 
monitored. 
2.5.5 Building Social Capital 
Trust is an important component of social capital and investments in empowerment 
ventures requires an extraordinary degree of trust to attract capital. This includes 
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exogenous trust by third party investors and financiers as well as endogenous trust 
among the contracting parties. Trust being the outcome of repeated interactions is thus 
deficient in the initial stages and can at best be provided, to commence with and 
through referral (i.e. weak ties). This referral system could well operate via catalytic 
interventions of benevolent agents with an encompassing interest. Hence, current 
workers, existing black farmers and entrepreneurs are the key target groups. This 
implies network renewal across the racial divide through coaptation. Theory suggests 
that under such circumstances where transaction costs are likely to be high, parties 
who need to forge credible commitments may opt for longer term relational 
contracting. This creates commitment and limits short-term opportunism whilst is 
allows for a defined evolutionary process. There is evidence in South African history 
where this system could have developed, though imperfectly if not halted by racist 
politics. Van Onselen's (1996) work on the Life ofKas Maine provides an account of 
a black sharecropping history. Van Onselen states "the troubled relationship between 
black and white South Africans cannot be fully understood by focusing on what tore 
them apart and ignoring what held them together". It is the latter that needs to be 
rediscovered as social capital to sustain new forms of empowerment in agricultural 
partnerships. 
Social capital has become badly eroded, remained undeveloped, or remained captured 
among insular groups in South Africa. This assessment is by no means ominous. 
Putnam (1995) provides some consolation in claiming that often business 
relationships are developed from 'weak ties' and lead to an increase in social capital 
with positive interactions over time. The critical step is therefore the initial advance as 
a goodwill-based gesture or referral with limited opportunism. Goodwill is not 
enough. The situation represents clear market failure and justifies state intervention in 
creating an enabling environment with effective incentives and checks on 
opportunism. In addition it may be necessary to cater for missing markets for equity, 
human capital, and information. Finally, likely unintended consequences such as 
capital flight due to some failures, diluted equity due to unforeseen volatility, and 
cooperative action problems must be managed and catered for. 
Developmental efforts should target those with whom social capital can be developed 
with greater ease and multiplier effects. There is a current preoccupation that this 
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group should be existing farmworkers. The issue is somewhat contentious despite all 
the possible human capital arguments in its favour. Firstly, workers are not 
entrepreneurs, though some may elevate to this level, but this is not assured. Second, 
social capital between workers and employees is often distorted by paternalism, 
shirking behaviour, bad labour practices, insubordination and the like. Thirdly, worker 
groups are beriddled with cooperative action problems. Power relations between 
employers and employees may stem entrepreneurship. These remarks are not meant to 
discourage the practice of worker empowerment. Instead it is intended to urge for a 
balanced approach in identifying empowerment beneficiaries.. Black farmers, 
entrepreneurs (including the new elite), and the youth must be equally targeted. 
2.5.6 Entrepreneurship 
Most of the critique levelled against transaction cost economics and the theory of the 
firm ends with the recognition of the critical role of entrepreneurship and constructive 
internal dynamism as key determinants in the evolution of institutions or the learning 
firm (Schumpeter, 1942; Penrose, 1959 in Best; Best, 1990; Dietrich, 1994). The firm 
is generally seen as a central authority (Coase), functioning as a unit/team (Penrose), 
keeping a check on strategic behaviour (Alchian and Demsetz), entrepreneurial 
(Schumpeter), minimising production costs (neo classical theory), minimizing 
transaction costs (Williamson), and inducing efficiency through the external 
competitive environment (Porter). As stated earlier, economic development efforts 
must primarily be aimed at unleashing the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs and 
organisations with the requisite internal dynamism to survive in a competitive 
environment. 
2.5.7 Embedded Autonomy 
The successes achieved with economic development through embedded autonomy are 
hard to ignore. It presents a proven approach at inception, especially in East Asia 
despite the longer-term efficiency losses pointed out by Bardhan (2000). This 
approach calls for the development of a technocratic elite who would collaborate with 
the developmental state in forming an empowerment politburo. This group can be 
representative of demographic realities as far as possible but should eo-opt and 
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actively engage (through incentives) those with economic power. This by itself may 
create a network of engagement and reciprocity as the active ingredients in social 
capital. They would be more tolerant of their own failures and could become 
increasingly galvanized in the pursuit of economic objectives. Demographic 
representation is essential in avoiding group favouritism against which Olson has 
cautioned. 
2.5.8 Supply Chains 
Finally a note on value chains is necessary given the continued industrialization of 
agriculture and the disappearance of the farm problem (Bonnen and Schweikhardt, 
1999). NIE analysis of supply chains favour the investigation of transaction costs with 
a view to identifying chain inefficiencies and suggesting corrective measures through 
improved governance, logistics, information flows and vertical coordination. 
However, one is often confounded when high transaction costs are identified which 
stem from the institutional environment and embeddedness (see Figure 2.1 ). It is 
therefore necessary to pay attention to the causes of transaction costs as opposed to 
just the effects, in order to effectively deal with it. Embeddedness factors (distrust, 
racism, paternalism, social dominance, etc.) often account for the lack of participation 
by emerging entrepreneurs in value chains. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Institutional economics, in both the old and new tradition, have much to offer by way 
of economic approaches to contemporary developmental challenges in South Africa. 
The old institutional economics especially re-emerges as the critical basis for an 
economic intuition required in addressing complexity. In this instance, understanding 
has to take precedence over knowing, and credible processes take precedence over 
ideal outcomes. Moreover, historical context is acknowledged as a critical facet of 
institutional analyses. Institutions are most essential to the functioning of economies, 
markets and organizations, despite its neglect in neoclassical economics. Social 
capital is established as an important component of institutional economic analysis 
and particularly relevant in situation where social capital has been eroded by political 
economic manipulations. Attending to social capital require (inter alia) insight into 
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the nature of the societal context, implied path dependency, extent of trust, 
enforcement mechanisms, and agency relations. 
The theoretical basis established in this paper was applied to several economic 
development challenges such as land reform, building social capital, organizational 
design, supply chain management, an entrepreneurial development. Whilst the 
application is not comprehensive, it is considered useful in focusing attention on 
institutional aspects when studying contemporary economic challenges. 
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Two corporate fishing companies have been farming mussels successfully in the bay 
for about eight years, and the prospects bear good promise. The world consumption of 
mussels total about 2.5 million tons per annum (1997) of which 65% is considered as 
inferior quality and the remaining 35% in short supply. Poor and deteriorating water 
quality, overstocking, and subsequent poor growth rates are problems that plague 
mussel production globally. The world market is however growing steadily, and local 
consumption, which lags well behind global levels, is also expected to increase 
considerably. 
Mussel farming involves growing mussels clustered to ropes, which are suspended 
from floating wooden rafts. Rafts are stocked at about one per hectare. A 50 ha area of 
was allocated for mussel mariculture by Portnet who administers the Bay. This area 
has been placed under the custodian ship of a non-governmental organisation active in 
enterprise development in disadvantaged communities. A pilot project was 
implemented with the assistance of a corporate fishing company who also farms 
mussels in the bay. They provided the rafts on a cost recovery basis to new farmers, as 
well as extension services, guaranteed markets, inputs on account, and other logistical 
assistance. The pilot project is in the process of being replicated with the 
establishment of additional growers each year. 
The small scale farming project commenced around the 1996 when the author was 
employed in the non-government sector and engaged in enterprise development. This 
involved assisting a large corporate named Sea harvest to establish outgrowers from 
the disadvantaged community. A pilot project was implanted with one farmer and 
proved to be technically feasible given considerable productivity and efficiency gains 
realized. Diligence and human capital challenges however brought human failure and 
coupled with political and cooperative action problems led to a much slower 
replication of the project over time. The author has remained involved in the 
continued development of this project ever since. Sea Harvest eventually sold the 
mussel concern to Blue Blue Aquafarm who continued the initiative of establishing 
small growers who are selected their labourers. 
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3.3 THE TRANSACTION COST APPROACH 
3.3.1 Theory 
The theoretical base for determining the appropriate organisational design for mussel 
farming is found within the realm of New institutional Economics, and more 
specifically transaction cost economics. This discourse was given impetus by Ronald 
Coase, who in his epic studies on the 'Nature of the Firm' began to acknowledge that 
the price mechanism could not coordinate production alone as there are often costs of 
using the price mechanism i.e. transaction costs (Coase, 1937, 1998). Coase defines 
transaction costs as the full costs of conducting exchanges (Coase, 1960). 
A next beacon was Oliver Williamson's 'Markets and Hierarchies' (1975), which lead 
to an elaboration of the transaction cost framework. This was especially useful in 
studying vertical integration, product diversification, the organisation of work, the 
multidivisional structure of corporations, and other aspects (Williamson, 1975; Dow, 
1986). Eggertson (1990) provides a further exposition oftransaction costs by arguing 
that transaction costs arise when information is costly and induces activities such as 
information searches, bargaining, making contracts, monitoring, enforcement, and 
protection of property rights. It is argued that it is essentially high transaction costs 
which constrain the participation of small farmers in the open market economy 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; Hoff, et al, 1993). 
Delgado (1998) advocates for market reforms aimed at eradicating barriers to 
smallholder participation in the market economy. However, he acknowledges that 
such measures have often failed to confront 'hidden' reasons for lack of market 
participation such as information asymmetry, unenforceable contracts, lack of skills 
and ability to engage effectively, and so forth. This is also the view of Williamson 
(1985) who states that transaction costs arise under conditions of (a) imperfect 
knowledge; (b) imperfect rationality i.e. opportunistic, immoral, or illegal behaviour; 
and (c) imperfect mobility of resources e.g. asset specificity (Bonnen and 
Schweikhardt, 1999). 
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3.3.2 A Transaction Cost Framework 
Alston and Gillespie (1988) developed a framework to model the effects of 
transaction costs on relationships between firms (Table 3.1 ). Their proposed 
framework classifies transaction costs by crossing three factors of production with the 
three stages in the production process. The factors appearing under the 'pre-
production' and post-production' categories are factors that encourage production 
within firms. The factors appearing under the 'production' category are costs of using 
the firm. This framework is later used in categorizing and analysing transaction costs 
associated with this industry. 
Table 3.1: A structure of transaction costs 
Factors of Production process 
Production Pre-production Production Post-production 
Physical and Asset specificity Abuse and agency costs 
financial capital 
Human capital Information constraints Coordination costs Measurement of 
and asset specificity output and contract 
enforcement 
Work intensity Shirking and contract 
enforcement 
Source: Alston and Gillespie, 1988. 
A more specified framework which is also based on the transaction costs for 
smallholder contract farming in Africa was developed by Delgado (1998). In this 
framework transaction cost factors are identified in production, processing/marketing, 
and the economic and political environment. In addition, the various farming models 
are presented i.e. (i) independent small operators, (ii) contract institutions between 
small operators and processors/marketers, (iii) franchises, and (iv) vertically 
integrated more specialised large firms. This framework will be adapted and applied 
to the mussel farming case in the next section (illustrated in Table 3.2). The concept 
of agricultural franchising is explained in section 4. Table 3.2 compares the 
transactions costs across four selected models. 
The models graduate from independent small growers to a large vertically integrated 
firm and a franchise as the more sophisticated enterprise form. It is anticipated that the 
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franchise is a form of idealised design in that it enables all risks to be catered for in 
the franchise agreement. Transaction costs are compared relatively across each model 
because theoretically it is not the absolute, but rather the relative values that matter. 
Moreover, the real value of the exercise comes from the identification of transaction 
costs. This requires much insight and tacit knowledge of the business that can only be 
generated through intensive observation over long periods and depends much on 
human judgement. 
Table 3.2: A transaction cost framework for small-scale mussel farming 
Identified transaction costs and Indepen- Contract Agri- Vertically 
inducing factors that may manifest dent farming cultural integrated 
small franchises specialised 
growers large firms 
Pre-production 
Asset specificity of rafts and equipment - + ++ ++ 
Inter firm informational asymmetry - - + + 
Bureaucracy to obtain water tenure - - + + 
High investment requirements - - + + 
Adverse selection of growers 
- - ++ + 
Production 
Diseconomies of scale + + + -
Returns to research and development - + ++ ++ 
Entrepreneurial and managerial capacity - + ++ + 
Moral hazard - - + ++ 
Shirking behaviour - + + -
Hold-up from under-performance 
- - + ++ 
High value to weight commodity - + + ++ 
Product losses from lack of coordination - + + + 
with processor 
Ability to enforce contracts - - + ++ 
Processing/Marketing 
Economies of scale in marketing - + ++ ++ 
Marketing opportunism (prisoners 
- + + + 
dilemma) 
Export market penetration 
- - + + 
High investment cost/risk - - - + 
Informational asymmetry - + ++ ++ 
Quality specificity (form utility) - + + -
Economic and Political Environment 
Land access costs + + + -
Poorly integrated output markets - + + ++ 
Stringent financial markets - - - + 
Deficient input/factor markets - + ++ ++ 
Economic empowerment imperatives + + + -
- unfavourable + favoured ++ highly favoured 
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3. 3.2.1 Pre-production transaction costs 
The floating rafts on which the mussels are produced do not have any alternate use 
and, once constructed, it cannot easily be changed. This implies a high degree of asset 
specificitl. Informational constraints (asymmetry) are also considered to bring pre-
production transaction cost because they influence the way in which transactions are 
forged for the purposes of production. In this case, transaction costs arise due to the 
cost of information transmission from the corporate entity, which is more 
knowledgeable about the technology and production techniques, to the new 
entrants/growers .. In addition it also involves maladaptation costs given that new 
growers lack the requisite experience and are thus more prone to error. The 
bureaucratic costs are rather high for individual farmers who wish to acquire a lease 
over an area of water from the local and Port authorities, as well as all the other 
project support elements required (e.g. extension, inputs, markets, technology, 
equipment, etc.). Investment costs are particularly high for individual operators due to 
the cost of screening, bargaining and monitoring as well as the adverse selection 
problems that usually accompany credit provision. 
Beneficiary/grower selection has been a tedious process over three years. The first 
grower who commenced the pilot phase exhibited a high level of technical 
competence and subsequent efficiency, surpassing industry average yields per rope by 
a significant margin. Unfortunately there was failure in managerial ability and 
responsible behaviour (moral hazard), causing hold-up problems. The cumbersome 
public participation and awareness endeavours aimed at eliciting interest and 
identifying prospective growers, few of whom had any entrepreneurial experience, 
increased the risk of adverse (beneficiary) selection. The original purpose of attracting 
entrepreneurial individuals to engage in mussel farming did not yield sufficient 
interest or ended in opportunistic behaviour and debilitating cooperative action 
problems. 
In conclusion, the transaction costs identified under the pre-production category tend 
to favour a higher degree of vertical integration or coordination as opposed to small 
2 Asset specificity is relevant when one party in a transaction makes an investment that cannot be fully 
recovered if the transaction is terminated (Williamson, 1981 ). 
46 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
independent growers or contract fanning. Franchises as the more sophisticated fonn of 
contracting appear to have somewhat equal merit to specialised vertical integrated finns. 
3.3.2.2 Production based transaction costs 
At the inception of the project it was expected that small growers would have 
production efficiency advantages compared to larger enterprises. Experience to date 
has confinned this, as the first grower was able to achieve an average rope yield of 
64kg per rope, which is significantly higher (42%) than the 45kg per rope achieved on 
rafts managed by the large corporate. The absolute yields could fluctuate with the 
nutritional status of the water resource, but the yield efficiency margin between big 
and small could be retained. This is mainly due to the ability of small growers to more 
effectively monitor and manage the growth of the mussels on-raft. Besides the 
incentives to monitor thought attaining better quality product and prices, small 
growers are also able to exert more individual and family effort at lower cost 
compared to larger finns. Transaction costs (inter alia) therefore increase with a 
higher degree of vertical integration, thus favouring smaller enterprises. Larger finns 
are however better at investing in and internalising the costs of research and 
development, placing them at an advantage over smaller firms. New entrants lack 
managerial and entrepreneurial ability, which under most circumstances encourages 
vertical integration. The political challenges of economic empowerment, livelihood 
creation, and the like do not favour large and vertically integrated firms. Moral hazard 
and subsequent hold-up problems have occurred with contract farming to date. This is 
mainly due to the lack of enforceability of contracts between large companies, 
growers, and other service providers. Large companies bear the risks of shirking3 by 
employees, which partly explains the efficiency of smaller enterprises Shirking is an 
intra-firm 'principle-agent' problem, which can be solved through smallholder 
contract-farming and franchises. 
The marketable yield per rope is about 20 percent of total, indicating low value to 
weight in primary production. Once sold to the processor the situation changes to high 
value to weight. This favours vertical linkages and coordination between growers and 
3 Shirking is defined as a deviation from expected behaviour by employees (Alston and Gillespie, 
1988) which reduces the productivity of the firm (Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1988). 
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processors. The same holds for the high perishability of the product. The lack of 
contract enforcement again favours more vertical integration. This lack of 
enforcement stems firstly from the socio-political environment whereby white 
dominated firms are prompted to contribute to the economic development of 
previously disenfranchised people and requires gestures of goodwill on their part. 
Secondly, when contract growers default both formal (law) and informal (peer 
penalties) mechanisms are ineffective in the short run because of a general lack of 
business history and precedent. Franchises have the advantage of enabling individual 
growers (franchisees) with less enforcement risks than the contract growers bur would 
require higher levels of technical competence. 
In conclusion, the transaction cost factors considered under the production category 
mostly favour more vertical integration, with the important exception of diseconomies 
of size which favours small-scale farming. Hence, franchising seems to be the 
favoured model for production. 
3.3.2.3 Processing I Marketing based transaction costs 
Economies of scale in marketing emanate from the importance of grading and quality 
assurance. Individual growers attain yields that are too varied with regard to size and 
quality to be able to penetrate more lucrative local, export, and other niche markets 
individually. Processing equipment (excluding grading) is also subject to scale 
efficiencies, and best employed in large and better-endowed enterprises. Some post-
harvest activities like cleaning, declumping and grading can be done on raft by the 
grower, and improves price margins for growers. There is also informational 
asymmetry on processing techniques, marketing channels, contacts, and processing 
related services. Marketing of mussels presents a real case of 'prisoner's dilemma' 
where individual growers are often tempted to sell direct at higher premiums to 
retailers, restaurants and other buyers. This happens at the expense of an interlinked 
marketing arrangement with a large processor, whose interest is best served by 
procuring the best sizes and quality of mussels from growers. In return they also 
provide other support services e.g. extension, raft construction, seed, some equipment, 
and goodwill based on ad hoc assistance. For this category, franchises and vertically 
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integrated firms are generally preferred, whilst contract growers and franchises are 
better at maintain quality. 
3.3.2.4 Political and economic transaction costs 
The high cost of agricultural land acquisition in South Africa necessitates that 
innovative and alternative livelihood opportunities in agriculture be sought. Small-
scale mariculture requiring very little land, is certainly such an opportunity since the 
cost of access to a water lease is negligible compared to the cost of land. The reality 
that small-scale farming is largely under-developed in South Africa means that input 
and output markets are consequently underdeveloped for this sector. However, these 
markets do exist for large-scale commercial agriculture and mariculture. The 
challenge is identifying and, if necessary appropriating these markets for small 
growers. This has not been problematic in mussel farming. Without such integration, 
access to input and output markets would constitute high transaction costs to small 
growers. The prevailing political-economic dispensation in South Africa favours the 
creation and support of small and medium enterprises, which are supported by large 
corporate entities, as opposed to vertical integration by the corporates. In this context 
franchises, contract farming, and independent small growers are more acceptable. 
In conclusion, it generally appears that higher levels of vertical integration are 
favoured, but contract farming and especially franchises have compelling merits as 
well. Three factors militate against specialised vertically integrated firms in favour of 
franchises and contract farming i.e. diseconomies of size, shirking, and quality 
specificity. From a transaction cost point of view, franchises appear more 
advantageous than contract farming on the majority of transaction cost factors. This is 
evident in practice where contract farming failed to adequately address all the 
transaction costs. This is manifested in the limited replicability of the existing contract 
farming model. It must be admitted that other factors like the inaccessibility of the 
allocated site also contributed to the delays. However, it is considered easier to 
incorporate measures into the design of the franchise to cater for transaction costs, 
than in the case of contract farming. Franchisees are more reactive to risk, better at 
dealing with contract enforcement, export market penetration, high investment costs, 
informational asymmetry, and deficient input factors. Franchises are also less prone to 
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hold-up problems, moral hazard, adverse selection, and bureaucracy. At this juncture, 
it is necessary to elaborate on the definition and nature of franchising. 
3.4 AGRICULTURAL FRANCHISING 
Business format franchising, as opposed to product or brand franchising, is defined as 
a contractual relationship between two or more businesses, where the following exists 
(adapted from Rudolph, 1999): 
(i) A franchisor, providing inputs/services to franchisees. 
(ii) In return, franchisees pay the franchisor an initial sum as well as royalties that 
are tied to sales or profits. 
(iii) For at least one of the services provided by the franchisor, which covers an 
essential administrative or managerial function, the following set of conditions 
must hold simultaneously: (a) the service is subject to economies of size, (b) 
although there need not be rivalry in consuming the service, other firms in the 
industry who have not bought the franchise can be excluded from consuming 
it, (c) the provision of this service gives the franc hi sees a competitive 
advantage, and (d) the productivity of this service for the franchisee requires a 
long term contractual relationship. 
(iv) Although the franchisee is not employed by the franchisor, and has some 
discretion in decision-making, the franchisor has the right to monitor those 
actions of the franchisee that might cause negative external effects for other 
franchisees with respect to the condition above. 
(v) The franchisees do not share in the ownership of the franchisor firm. 
(vi) Limit growth potential for individual franchisees. 
(vii) A high degree of asset specificity ofthe production technology. 
(viii) A more or less vertical integrated structure must be less efficient. 
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The transaction cost factors favouring the selection of franchising as the farm model 
has been presented earlier. Here, the above conditions outlined for franchising can be 
tested on small-scale mussel mariculture. The franchisor could be an existing large 
corporate entity, with which the existing farmers have contracts, or a joint venture 
between relevant organisations. The appropriate option is the one that involves the 
corporate fishing company since they provide essential inputs and services to the 
growers. Prospective franchisees could be expected to pay a joining fee, which 
entitles them to the range of requisite services. Some flexibility and creativeness is 
required given that emerging growers have limited resources. Royalties may also be 
recovered from sales on a feasible basis. Growers would enter into this arrangement 
because it brings economies of scale in marketing, processing, research and 
development, input procurement, and improves their competitiveness through access 
to expertise/extension services, more price certainty, synchronised harvesting, and 
certainty on factor markets. The conditions on asset specificity and limited growth 
potential are also satisfied because only standard size mussel rafts are conventionally 
used, with hardly any alternative uses. Earlier it was also shown that a greater extent 
of vertical integration brings higher transaction costs. 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The New Institutional Economics and particularly transaction cost economics IS 
useful in modelling the effective participation of small farms in agribusiness and was 
applied in this paper. The development of efficiency based small-scale farming in 
South Africa involves, inter alia, forging linkages between large corporates and 
small-scale farmers. This relationship has to be based on improved efficiency and 
complementarity in the farming activity. Mussel farming has proven more productive 
on a small scale as opposed to large vertically integrated firms who suffer from 
diseconomies of scale. Both independent small-scale farming and large vertically 
integrated firms per se are, however, less efficient models due to higher transaction 
costs, compared to contract farming and franchises. This was determined by 
considering the transaction costs involved in the four farming models. 
Franchises would be more efficient than contract farming because they are better at 
dealing with contract enforcement, export market penetration, high investment costs, 
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informational asymmetry, and deficient input factors. Franchises are also less prone to 
hold-up problems, moral hazard, adverse selection, and bureaucracy. 
Mussel mariculture can satisfy the conditions required for franchises to operate 
successfully. A suitable franchisor could be, or include in a joint venture arrangement, 
the corporate entity which currently enters into contracts with mussel growers to 
effectively address the transactional constraints. The detail organisational design of 
the franchise model is an immediate challenge and the transaction cost factors 
identified in this paper would be useful in guiding this exercise. 
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CHAPTER4 
APPRAISING THE PROSPECTS OF CONTRACT FARMING IN OYSTER 
PRODUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurial development and economic empowerment in agriculture should 
capitalise on lucrative development opportunities in growing commodity sectors. The 
oyster industry presents this opportunity because, though still developing, it has the 
advantage of favourable market conditions and undeveloped available natural 
resources, well suited to oyster farming. In this paper, the possibilities of contract 
farming in the oyster industry are discussed by examining experiences with contract 
farming and the market imperfections associated with contract farming. From this, the 
appropriate contractual arrangements can be derived. 
The application in this paper to the oyster industry comes from the prior involvement 
of the author in the aquaculture sector and the mussel industry discussed in the 
previous chapter. This involvement entailed assessing the potential for empowering 
disadvantaged communities in the oyster industry on behalf of a government agency. 
This commenced with discussions and observations with the management of the 
largest oyster company in South Africa at the time called Knysna Oyster Company. 
This work later progressed when at the request of government the authors had to 
assess another oyster company named Diamond Coast Oysters with regard to 
economic empowerment. Whilst the insights gained from the oyster industry generally 
informed the study the focus in this paper is on Diamond Coast Oysters. This a 
venture started by a diamond mining concern in an attempt to diversify the economy 
of the diamond mining areas to ensure sustainable livelihoods once the diamond 
resources decline or become exhausted. This situation is envisaged, and it thus 
became necessary to consider extensions of the oyster venture as a sustainable 
business. The oyster business has however been subsidised by the diamond operation 
and run by salaried management and workers with little entrepreneurial incentives. As 
a result the business has not reached viability but has every potential to achieve this 
based on the positive experiences of other oyster firms. A key proposition is that 
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contract farming could further bring the required production efficiencies. Neither 
contract farming nor small scale growing existed at the time and this study is aimed at 
appraising its prospects in an ex ante fashion. 
The business currently operates as a single vertically integrated firm which is not 
considered the optimal organisational form for oysters given experiences in other 
countries and firms. Spot market transactions are also not favoured, and the challenge 
so falls on identifying an appropriate organisational form. Contract farming is 
considered a suitable institution, but suffers from various market imperfections which 
require certain contractual provisions. The provisions are derived from various 
experiences with contract farming in developing countries and from examining the 
imperfections in oyster contract farming, as proposed. 
Oyster contract farming is appraised using transaction costs analysis of various market 
imperfections similar to approaches followed by Key and Rungsten (1999), Delgado 
(1999), Karaan (1999), Kahkonen and Leathers (1999), and Minot (1986). First, the 
theoretical basis for an analysis of institutions is established. This is followed by a 
brief literature review of experiences with contract farming in developing countries. 
This involves the identification of critical success factors pertaining to contract 
farming and the associated inhibiting and enabling factors, which is later useful in 
designing an appropriate contractual arrangement. A concise overview of the oyster 
industry is then presented. Finally, specific imperfections and transactions costs are 
identified to derive an appropriate contractual arrangement. 
4.2 THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR CONTRACT FARMING 
Vertical coordination and contracts are well acknowledged as one feature of a post-
industrial agriculture (Bonnen and Schweikhardt, 1999, Barry, et a!, 1995, Boehlje, 
1996). Contract farming is a hybrid measure of vertical coordination in the continuum 
between spot markets and fully vertical integrated firms (Peterson and Wysocki, 1998, 
Mahoney, 1992, Minot, 1986, Williamson, 1975). Sporleder (1992) identifies five 
hybrid forms of organisation including: (1) cooperative bargaining, (2) contracting, 
(3) franchising, ( 4) joint venture arrangements, and (5) strategic alliances. Three 
contract types are distinguished, including: (i) resource-providing contracts, (ii) 
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market-specification contracts, and (iii) production-management contracts (Minot, 
1986, Key and Rungsten, 1999). 
Contract farming can be analysed from a New Institutional Economics perspective 
which views the formation of institutions as a response to missing markets in an 
environment of pervasive risk, incomplete markets, and informational asymmetry 
(Bardhan, 1989). The basis for discerning whether transactions are organised within 
firms through vertical integration or between firms, derives from the 'Coase theorem' 
(Coase, 1937), and the extensive subsequent work ofWilliamson (1975, 1986, 1991). 
Accordingly, firms will choose to organise transactions based on the nature of 
institutions and the transaction costs firms face with the respective options. The 
approach involves a consideration of transaction costs and organisation form in an 
iterative manner to determine a suitable institutional framework that minimises 
transaction costs. 
Firms will choose to contract in services if they perceive that this strategy reduces 
transaction costs. Transactions costs have been described as the costs of running an 
economic system; friction in the economic system; information imperfections, moving 
from ignorance to omniscience, reducing uncertainty, carrying out exchange (Coase 
1960, Kahkonen and Leathers, 1999, Williamson, 1975). It is important to distinguish 
between production costs and transaction costs though, as Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992) conceded a conceptual separation is troublesome because information 
imperfections pervade across these categories. Production costs generally depend on 
technology and inputs used, and transactions costs depend on the way transactions are 
organised. To this, Jaffee and Morton (1994) added 'transfer costs' which are the 
costs of marketing services performed in physical handling: transport, storage, 
wholesaling, retailing, losses. 
Transaction costs in marketing and processing in developing countries typically arise 
because market prices do not fully reflect the true costs and returns to participation to 
all actors who often are unequally endowed and for whom market solutions may not 
be available (Delgado 1999). Transaction costs in production result very often from 
asymmetries in assets and production as well as exchange patterns. Several studies 
have concluded that high transactions costs in either production and marketing of 
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potentially remunerative commodities exclude poorer farmers from participating in 
lucrative enterprises (Binswanger and Rozensweig, 1986, Jaffee and Morton, 1999, 
Delgado, 1999, Karaan, 2000, Key and Rungsten, 1999, Kiihkonen and Leathers, 1999). 
Contract farming can be explained as an institutional response to imperfections in 
markets for inter alia credit, insurance, information, factors of production, and raw 
materials. It combines some of the advantages of the plantation system with those of 
smallholder production (Glover, 1987). Jaffee and Morton (1999) provide the 
following categorisation of transactions costs: 
(a) Search costs: costs associated with identifying potential buyers and sellers. 
(b) Screening costs: costs associated with gathering information about the reliability 
of a buyer/seller and the quality of goods being transacted. 
(c) Bargaining costs: costs of gathering information on prices in other transactions, 
on factors that may influence the willingness to buy by the other party to the 
transaction, on implications of contract terms, etc. 
(d) Monitoring costs: costs associated with monitoring contract performance. 
(e) Enforcement costs: incurred in ensuring contract provisions are met, including 
the costs of default provisions. 
(f) Transfer costs: transport, storage, processing, retailing, wholesaling, and losses. 
4.3 EXPERIENCES WITH CONTRACT FARMING 
Experiences with contract farming are recorded and examined in several studies in 
different countries including seven East- and Southern African countries (Minot, 
1986, Williams and Karen 1985, Key and Rungsten, 1999, Glover 1990, Glover 1987, 
Glover and Kusterer, 1990, Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997. Maloa and Nkosi, 
1993 ). These studies provide important insights into the operations of contract 
farming and are summarised below (Table 4.1 ). First the critical factors are identified 
as they are manifested in these studies. Then, the inhibiting and enabling conditions 
associated with each are extracted. 
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Table 4.1: Summarised insights into the operations of contract farming 
Critical factors Inhibitors Enablers 
Technological Crop with long gestation periods bring High value crops 
determinism debt problems and exit barriers Intensive in loco supervision crops 
High levels of asset specificity Skilled labour requirements 
Rapidly changing technology Smallholder efficiency gains 
Pricing and Regulated prices for fair returns Lucrative market conditions 
payments Bureaucratic delays Tax incentives 
Livelihood dependency Formulae pricing linked to 
Growers not clear over deductions reasonable market fluctuations 
Incentives/penalties on uncontrollable Prices should provide clear signals 
factors/events and incentives 
High price volatility Alternative or non-farm income 
Demand shifts cause price variations Supply shifts cause price variations 
Prices consistently below spot market Prices and payments reduce income 
prices variability 
Property rights Uncertain tenure arrangements Feasible under stable common 
Power abuse property regimes 
Little safeguarding of investments Crop suitable as collateral 
Lack of contract enforcement Ready access to alternative land 
Management High informational asymmetry Effective farmer participation 
Good communication 
Human capital 
Institution-based trust 
Services High cost of extension Specialised extension linked to risk 
Contract risk (opportunism) Timely input supply and 
procurement 
Organisational Ambiguous goal Strong growers association 
and power Heterogeneity of growers Principal commands moral authority 
relations High vulnerability of growers leading to Conflict resolution mechanisms 
resentment and reduces risk taking 
Development objectives supersede 
profitability criteria 
Disrupting local power relations 
Entry and exit Lack of producer bargain power Small scale technology 
conditions Land scarcity Smallholder efficiency gains 
High training costs Human capital 
High asset specificity Externalised R&D costs 
Finance Inability to take-over operations under Principal provide initial capital and 
non-performance by grower cash flow 
Moral hazard Principal bears initial financial risk 
Adverse selection of growers Principal prepared to make 'patient' 
High asset specificity of financed asset or investments 
collateral Principal has good standing with 
financier/s 
Marketing High spot market prices causing prisoners Synchronised deliveries 
dilemma Grower exposed to unfavourable 
Principal favouritism towards some market conditions 
growers Safety nets 
Opportunism ad moral hazards e.g. bribes 
Growers treated as reserve suppliers 
Livelihoods Deferred gains Multiplier effects 
High dependency Prefer larger growers or growth 
Excessive fluctuations potential 
Promoted as a rural development strategy Access to family labour 
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4.4 BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE OYSTER INDUSTRY AND 
DIAMOND COAST OYSTERS 
South African oyster companies produce approximately 5 million oysters per annum, 
which produced by the four existing producers. This investigation is centred on the 
Diamond Coast Oyster Company (DCOC) which produces about 10% of this total 
local production (± 500 000 oysters p.a.). Diamond Coast Oysters is located on the 
north-western coast of the Northern Cape Province, a traditional diamond mining 
area. The area is well endowed with natural marine resources suitable for 
mariculture practices. The favourable market potential of oysters warrants the 
expansion ofthis operation. 
DCOC produces oysters on rafts buoyed by plastic drums in an earthen pond of about 
3.5-4ha in size. Spat were previously bought at around 12mm and grown to 
marketable size but lately DCOC began to import spat from Chile at 25mm to lower 
the mortality rate. Water destined for the diamond factory is channelled through the 
pond which saves significantly on pumping costs. This gives DCOC a comparative 
cost advantage over other producers but this will have to be contended with once the 
diamond operations cease (Karaan and Wiggins, 2000). 
Oyster farming is normally divided into three phases as follows: 
(I) Hatchery Phase: This involves a spawning and hatching process whereby spat is 
produced for sale as little as 2mm in size. However spat is mostly sold at 12 mm 
to oyster growers. South Africa does not have any successful hatcheries; 
consequently all spat are imported from countries like France and Chili. 
(2) Nursery phase: Growing from 12 mm to 25 mm. Other companies bring spat 
into their nursery at an even smaller size (2mm) because this is much cheaper 
and mortalities are then less costly. 
(3) Grow-out to harvest phase: Entails the placing of oysters (>25mm) in plastic 
crates stacked on iron rafts which are again suspended into the water. Thereafter 
the oysters are size graded at 6 months and replaced into the dam using the same 
technology. Market size is reached around 18 months. 
59 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The present technology is fairly obsolete for the industry as other producers have 
moved away from this system to growing bags on raft systems or long line systems. 
All producers are vertically integrated between the nursery and grow-out phases. One 
producer is however attempting to outsource the nursery phase to his workers in an 
attempt to encourage entrepreneurship and productivity (Karaan and Wiggins 2000). 
The DCOC operation employs a manager and about 6 permanent workers with an 
equal gender balance. There is however a gender division of labour where males 
perform mainly the stocking and harvesting functions and women the land based 
sorting, grading, cleaning, and packing tasks. Labourers are all from the diamond 
mining labour pool diverted to the oyster farm. Very few of the existing workforce 
has further entrepreneurial aspirations in this venture. The menial nature of oyster 
farming, pertaining to labour, implies that skills levels among the existing workers are 
not adequate as yet for an effective empowerment venture. Considerable effort has to 
go into capacity building and ongoing training on technical, financial, legal and 
economic matters. Labour costs constitute 40% of total operating expenses which is 
considerably higher than the industry average of 30-35%. 
A SWOT analysis ofDCOC revealed the following (Table 4.2): 
Table 4.2: SWOT analysis of the Diamond Coast Oyster Company 
Strengths Weaknesses 
1. A going concern 1. Project running at a loss 
2. Easily manageable 2. Poor product quality 
3. Good water quality 3. Inadequate husbandry 
4. Pumping cost externalised 4. Single undrainable pond with limited water 
5. Good security circulation 
6. Good market conditions 5. Pump not controlled by oyster manager 
7. DCOC management goodwill for 6. Remoteness 
privatisation 7. High seed costs vs low market price 
8. Committed financial contribution from 8. Low worker skills and motivation 
DCOC 9. Little record keeping 
I 0. Restricted access 
I I. Little customer contact 
I2. Minimal supply chain management 
Opportunities Threats 
1. Can improve management strategy 1. Factoring in pumping costs 
2. Expansion potential 2. Diseases and parasites 
3. Introducing other species 3. Increased market competition 
4. Establishing outgrowers 4. Diamond security impedance of management 
Source: Adapted from Karaan and Wiggins (2000). 
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DCOC has not been operating as a viable financial venture due mainly to poor 
management, inadequate husbandry practices, sustained subsidisation by the mining 
company, low productivity, cross-accounting with the mining operations, and a 
general lack of performance incentives. The prospects for remedying the situation are 
anticipated in privatisation of the enterprise, improving property rights, and 
smallholder development. This investigation is aimed at promoting this objective. 
4.5 MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Market imperfections encourage vertical coordination and subsequent establishment 
of contractual arrangements. The imperfections in financial markets, production 
technology, input markets, property rights, commodity markets, labour markets and 
power relations are identified below, and the implied contractual arrangements derived. 
The analysis points to the necessity for a combined resource-providing and market-
specification contract. It seems further necessary to also structure a production-
management contract for at least two years, which can be phased out as growers gain 
the envisaged production efficiencies from intensive in loco supervision. Firm size 
and grower remuneration must be commensurate with household labour availability to 
capitalise on this potential benefit. Third party involvement and intermediation is a 
prerequisite given the power relations and the critical importance of participatory 
planning. 
In the table below each market imperfection, risk and transaction cost is identified 
from field observation. The real value of the analysis lies in the identification of these 
factors as they require considerable time and insight to be derived. Each composite set 
of factors were clustered thematically and the implications for contract design elicited. 
These imperfections occur in financial markets, production technology, input markets, 
property rights, commodity markets, labour markets and power relations. To address 
these, a large firm should offer a resource-providing contract and a market-
specification contract, as well as a production management contract in the initial stages. 
Financial and extension services should also be inter-linked with such contracts. 
61 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Market imperfections and transactions costs Implied contractual arrangement 
Imperfect financial markets resulting in: DCOC acts as financial intermediary, providing 
(a) High cost of credit to small farmers collateral through operation buy-back or take-
(b) Growers lack collateral over options, collaborating with a growers 
(c) High production asset specificity association and the financier. 
(d) High shadow value of liquidity Insurance against non-performance. 
(e) Lack of financial intermediaries 
(f) High search screening, bargaining and 
monitoring costs with individual applicants 
(adverse selection and moral hazard) 
(g) Exogenous risk 
Informational asymmetry around production Commence with a production management 
information technology, timing, quality: contract. DCOC exerts strong management 
(a) Public subsidised extension unavailable responsibility initially to ensure adequate start-
(b) Access costs to new appropriate technology up (2 years). Contracts should be issued for 
(c) Bargaining, monitoring and enforcement nursery growers as this phase presents less 
costs of synchronised supply production risk. Later the role of DCOC declines 
(d) High labour supervision costs into an extension role once small grower 
(e) Shirking behaviour before realised returns efficiencies are realised. 
Imperfect markets for specialised inputs: Resource providing contract. 
(a) High transfer costs of input procurement 
(b) economies of scale 
Imperfections in property rights: Access provisions as far as legally possible. 
(a) Insecure tenure arrangements DCOC provides securities through a buy-back or 
(b) Contract enforcement costs take-over clause in case of grower default. 
(c) Insufficient collateral 
Marketing transactions costs: Market specification contract specifying a single 
(a) High transfer costs for individual growers market (DCOC), based on a formula price and 
(b) Prisoners dilemmas with spot market prices delivery times. This is backed with an extension 
(c) High price volatility costs to growers service. 
(d) Adverse product selection 
(e) Market/product informational asymmetry 
(f) Hold-up costs 
(g) Economies of scale 
Imperfections in labour markets: Firm size to be commensurate with household 
(a) Low skilled labour labour availability and reasonable compensation 
(b) Limited markets for family labour requirements, allowing for performance based 
(c) Disproportionate labour cost growth. 
(d) Low opportunity cost of labour 
(e) Lack of entrepreneurial organisation 
(f) Risk aversion 
Insufficient countervailing power: Third party role in facilitating a grower's 
(a) Asset specificity bring lock-in effects organisation, and intermediation. 
(b) Search screen and bargaining costs in Participatory planning. 
beneficiary selection and capacity building 
(c) Large firm monopoly 
(d) High contract enforcement costs (political) 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Contract farming is a hybrid form of vertical coordination in the continuum between 
spot markets and fully vertical integrated firms. It is also an institutional response to 
missing markets in an environment of pervasive risk, incomplete markets, and 
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informational asymmetry. Firms will therefore choose to organise transactions based 
on the nature of the institution and the implied transaction costs. The approach 
involved a consideration of transaction costs implied in contract farming to determine 
a contracting arrangement which minimises transactions costs and facilitates contract 
farming. 
Experiences with contract farming under developing country circumstances have 
shown the significance of technological determinism, and appropriate pricing, 
payments, services, management, organisational design, power relations, entry and 
exit conditions, finance, marketing arrangements and livelihood implications. Various 
enabling and inhibiting factors related to each of the aspects have to taken into 
account in designing contract farming arrangements. 
The natural tendency for oyster producers would remain to be vertically integrated as 
far as possible because the industry is still small and growing, which may not be the 
most opportune time for introducing options that bring greater contract risk. 
Nevertheless, contract farming holds promise for the industry through the potential 
efficiency gains it could bring. The industry is faced with a unique opportunity for 
establishing contract nursery growers. 
DCOC has to deal with the challenges of improving its' viability which is mainly a 
function of management. The company is excellently endowed with natural resources 
(water and ponds) and enjoys several benefits from the diamond operations which 
position it well for further development under an improved management regime. Above 
all, the industry is in a growth phase with favourable and stable market conditions. 
Oyster contract farming however faces several market imperfections and transactions 
costs as opposed to large vertically integrated firms. These imperfections occur in 
financial markets, production technology, input markets, property rights, commodity 
markets, labour markets and power relations. To address these, a large firm should 
offer a resource-providing contract and a market-specification contract, as well as a 
production management contract in the initial stages. Financial and extension services 
should also be inter-linked with such contracts. 
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Firm size and grower remuneration must be commensurate with household labour 
availability to capitalise on this potential benefit. Third party involvement and 
intermediation is a prerequisite given the power relations and the critical importance 
of participatory planning. 
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CHAPTERS 
A NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LARGE FRESH 
PRODUCE MARKETS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL SECTORS UNDER CHANGING MARKET CONDITIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural fresh produce in South Africa has largely been transacted via large 
national fresh produce markets located in each of the 16 large urban metropoles 
around the country. The Cape Town fresh produce market is the second largest and is 
also the subject of this paper. The fresh produce markets all operate as commission 
sales markets operated by registered market agents. The Cape Town market 
accommodates about seven agents who share the entire turnover of over R600 million 
(rand) per annum. The market is the property of the local authority (Cape 
Metropolitan Council) and managed by a market manager. The market is governed by 
a formalised sales system, an insurance system, a national training system, a security 
system, a supply system and an informal pricing system. Various Acts, laws, bylaws 
and regulations exist to support these mechanisms. The legislation was enacted 
national and local government to facilitate marketing of fresh produce by market 
agents who would intermediate between farmers and urban traders. This occurred at a 
time when the government was introducing various mechanisms and laws to develop 
and support white commercial farming, marginalise black people in the economy and 
generally entrench the domination ofwhite people in the economy. Such mechanisms 
pervaded throughout the country and all sectors of the economy. Despite the advent of 
democracy in South Africa, the previous mechanisms became institutionalised and 
embedded in the social and business environment. These remnants of the past hence, 
remain active to some extent and can be observed even in the fresh produce markets, 
though in a diluted or obscured form. Such remnant may deter achieving racial equity 
imperatives of fresh produce markets. 
Large fresh produce markets have in the past occupied a dominant position in the 
fresh produce supply chain in South Africa, but this position has changed in recent 
years. Modem day marketing of perishables is characterised by a need for greater 
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supply coordination and vertical integration. This is a global trend. Subsequently, 
there has been increased circumvention of markets and opportunistic behaviour on 
markets. This occurrence is corroborated by experiences in countries such as Brazil 
and Australia (Farina, et a!, 1999). The key proposition in this paper is that markets as 
governance institutions have to adapt (i.e. institutionally evolve) to changes m 
embeddedness, the institutional environment, and institutions of governance to 
improve economic performance. 
The study is based on the author's experience in conducting several studies around the 
feasibility of fresh produce markets and the empowerment of informal traders. These 
studies involved designing and determining the viability of new markets. This work 
resulted in the drafting of business plans and ultimately the establishment of markets 
in Umtata, Gaberone and Cape Town. This work was later followed by a 
commissioned study into assessing the lack of participation and graduation of black 
traders as market agents. The study involved several visits to markets, interviews with 
key stakeholders (traders, management, associations, etc.) and unobtrusive 
observation of activities of on the markets over intermittently over several months. 
Valuable insights were derived from discussions with stakeholders in the course of 
conducting the abovementioned investigations often at the behest of black traders 
frustrated by the impediments they face in participating in the markets. Particularly 
valuable were the insights gained from lengthy historical accounts of older traders 
who had devoted careers and family histories to deriving livelihoods and economic 
gain from the markets. A history of black exclusion and white preference was not only 
a political reality, but became engrained in the institutional character and governance 
of the markets. It was clear from the onset that advancing black participation in the 
markets would require a thorough understanding of this history and must be addressed 
and untangled (where possible) to promote black more equitable participation. 
The paper takes the form of an institutional economic analysis of fresh produce 
markets based on concepts in transaction cost economics. These costs are often 
difficult to quantify but this difficulty is mitigated by the fact that transaction costs are 
always assessed in a comparative institutional way, in which modes of contracting are 
compared. Accordingly, it is the difference between rather than the absolute 
magnitude of transactions costs that matters (Williamson, 1985). The approach is 
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conceptual but useful as it facilitates decision making on various institutional 
development options. Deliberating over such options is considered the key challenge 
to market management. 
The first section establishes a conceptual new institutional economic framework that 
is considered useful in analysing fresh produce markets. This framework is applied in 
the following section by appraising the performance of markets. The key findings are 
concluded in the next section, where after recommendations towards enhanced 
governance and economic performance are made. 
5.2 A NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
5.2.1 Neoclassical Limitations 
Researching agricultural marketing has traditionally followed a descriptive approach 
(Loader, I 997) based on the neoclassical paradigm. Economists have since 
acknowledged the limitations of this approach, which is generally premised on a 
single homogenous-product firm, operating in a perfectly competitive market, with a 
large number of competitor firms producing the same product under the same 
conditions and facing the same demand curve. Economic agents are assumed to 
possess perfect information and to face no uncertainty. Neoclassical economic 
analysis focuses on equilibrium market outcomes. The neoclassical shortcomings 
however, stem from its limited ability to explain the existence of firms, the nature of 
organisations, inter-firm relations, transactions, contracts, hierarchies, power relations, 
and so forth. 
5.2.2 Nature of the Firm 
Coase started to shed light on this void in commencing a discourse on the 'Nature of 
the Firm' (Coase, 1937), which essentially recognised that there are costs to using the 
market mechanism (price system). Douma and Schreuder (1992) explain this Coasian 
position as accepting that coordination of the economic system can occur via markets 
or organisations. Hence markets may be avoided by coordinating economic activity 
within firms. This essentially is the new institutional motivation for why firms exist. 
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The costs of using the market mechanism are transaction costs, which occurs when a 
good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface. 
5.2.3 Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs specifically refer to the costs of (i) price discovery, (ii) negotiating 
contracts for each transaction, and (iii) specifying the details of a transaction (Hobbs, 
1996). Williamson (1975) refers similarly to ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Ex 
ante transaction costs refer to the costs of preparing contracts, executing contracts, 
and monitoring agent behaviour before contracting. Ex post transaction costs include: 
(i) the maladaptation costs incurred when transactions drift out of alignment, (ii) the 
haggling costs incurred to correct ex post misalignments, (iii) dispute settlement costs, and 
(iv) bonding costs to effect secure commitments (Eggertson, 1990, Williamson, 1985). 
Williamson (1996) further elaborates on the differences between transaction cost 
economics and orthodoxy. He states six critical differences:(!) behavioural 
assumptions (bounded rationality and opportunism), (2) transaction as the unit of 
analysis, (3) the description of the firm as a governance structure, (4) the insistence that 
property rights and contracts are problematic, (5) the reliance on discrete structural 
analysis (different organisational structures), and (6) the 'remediableness' criterion (i.e. 
flawed alternatives). These principles are implicitly applied later in this analysis. 
The transaction costs approach proposed by Coase (1937, p395) implies that a firm 
will carry out economic activities internally for as long as it is able execute this at a 
lower cost than the open market. To achieve this, firms may vertically integrate or 
vertically coordinate i.e. find alignment (Frank and Henderson, 1992, Hobbs, 1996, 
Williamson, 1975, Mahoney, 1992, Douma and Schreuder, 1992). The key 
implication here is that firms will vertically integrate or align transactions to 
economise on transaction costs, which often means bypassing existing but less 
efficient markets. Transaction costs thus determine whether transactions are organised 
within a firm (hierarchy) or between autonomous firms (markets). 
Transaction costs analysis embodies four key concepts. First, bounded rationality, 
which refers to behaviour that is 'intendedly rational but only limitedly so' (Simon, 
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1961 in Williamson, 1996). This stems from the fact that humans have limited ability 
to anticipate all potential outcomes of economic decisions, especially under conditions 
of complexity and uncertainty. Hence, all complex contracts are unavoidably 
incomplete. Second, opportunism, defined by Williamson as 'self-interest seeking 
with guile'. This acknowledges the perpetual risk of individuals seeking to exploit a 
situation to their own advantage. Third, asset specificity refers to a situation where an 
asset cannot be redeployed to an alternative use without a significant reduction in the 
value of the asset (Douma and Schreuder, 1991 ). Fourth, informational asymmetries, 
whereby it is acknowledged that business exchanges are characterised by incomplete, 
imperfect or asymmetrical information. 
Informational asymmetry arises when there is public information available to all 
parties but also private information available to selected parties, which induces 
asymmetry. This leads to ex ante and ex post opportunism. Ex ante opportunism 
involves concealing information prior to a transaction with negative effects to the 
other party i.e. adverse selection, or the so-called 'market for lemons' as defined by 
Akerlof in 1970. Ex post opportunism involves the moral hazards brought by 
individuals who opportunistically increase personal welfare because their actions are 
not directly observable e.g. negligence after insurance (Hobbs, 1996). 
Transaction costs depend on three critical dimensions of transactions: ( 1) asset 
specificity (see explanation above), (2) uncertainty/complexity (bounded rationality), 
and (3) frequency (Douma and Schreuder, 1991). A more detailed application of 
transaction costs analysis based on the above three aspects was conducted by Loader 
(1997), and will only be partially expounded in this paper. 
5.2.4 Firms as Governance Structures 
An often-neglected part of economics is the understanding of firms as governance 
structures. In this respect, Williamson (1985) advances the following: (i) forms of 
formal organisation matters, (ii) informal organisation has instrumental purposes, (iii) 
opportunism is a subtle and pervasive condition of human nature, (iv) bounds on 
rationality are acknowledged, (v) adaptive sequential decision making is vital to 
organisational effectiveness, (vi) the transaction is the basic unit of analysis, (vii) tacit 
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knowledge is important. These propositions form an essential part of the conceptual 
framework used to appraise the performance of markets and firms. 
Williamson ( 1985) discusses the significance of governance costs under alternative 
governance structures, and states that if economies of scale and scope are held 
constant then choice between firm and market turns entirely to governance costs. He 
further discusses this in a later paper (Williamson, 1991) by including in his 
discussion of governance costs the offsetting of bureaucratic costs against adaptive 
gains from hierarchical governance. 
5.2.5 Property Rights 
Markets, like firms, can be seen as physical assets and require consideration of 
property rights. The transaction cost approach acknowledges that ownership matters, 
where rights of asset ownership take three forms: the right to use, to appropriate 
returns, and to change the substance/form of an asset. Williamson (1985) explains that 
the property rights approach would inter alia inquire whether mistaken property rights 
assignments are responsible for resource misallocations. Contracting now becomes 
important as the means by which control is allocated. 
5.2.6 Contracts 
Contracts are the means of transacting and warrant some attention. Contracts can take 
one of four forms: (i) planning (ii) promise (iii) competition (iv) governance. Three 
behavioural assumptions are used to determine the form of contracting i.e. bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity. This decision framework appears below. 
A + means the specified factor is present and a 0 means the specified factor is absent. 
Behavioural assumptions Implied contracting 
Bounded rationality Opportunism Asset specificity process 
0 + + Planning 
+ 0 + Promise 
+ + 0 Competition 
+ + + Governance 
Source: Williamson, 1985. 
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5.2. 7 Asset Specificity 
Technology is a key determinant of asset specificity and economic organisation. This 
is especially true when (i) there is a single technology that is decisively superior to all 
other and (ii) that technology requires a unique organisational form. Asset specificity 
arises when transactions have to be supported by investments in durable, transaction 
specific assets, which bring lock-in effects and has relation to sunk costs. Often such 
investments cannot be redeemed when transaction costs are terminated. Williamson 
makes six distinctions of asset specificity: (1) site specificity, (2) physical asset 
specificity, (3) human asset specificity, (4) dedicated assets, (5) brand name capital, 
and (6) temporal specificity. The key implication here is that asset specificity elicits 
complex ex ante incentive responses and more importantly induces ex post 
governance structure responses. For example higher levels of asset specificity 
encourage greater ·control to ensure that there is a return on highly dedicated 
investments. Fresh produce markets as designed and dedicated infrastructure are 
subject to this condition. 
5.2.8 Institutional Analysis Framework 
In examining the economics of institutions, Williamson distinguishes four levels of 
social analysis, illustrated below. 
THE ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS 
Level Purpose Theory 
Levell Embeddedness: Protection, preservation, Social theory 
(Informal institutions, power 
traditions, norms, religion, 
culture, socio-political 
imperatives, etc.) 
Leve12 Institutional environment: First order economising: Economics of property 
Formal rules of game: Get the institutional rights 
(property rights, laws, environment right Positive political theory 
constitutions, etc.) 
Level3 Governance: Second order economising: Transaction cost economics 
Play of the game: Get the governance 
(aligning governance structure right 
structures with transactions) 
Leve14 Neoclassical analysis: Third order economising: Neoclassical economics 
Performance: Get the marginal conditions Agency theory 
(optimality, prices, right 
quantities, incentives, etc.) 
Source: Adapted from Williamson, 1999. 
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Level 1 does not strictly fall in the realm of economics but rather that of social theory. 
However, its profound impact on the economic functioning of institutions necessitates 
that it be considered. Levels 2 and 3 have traditionally been the concern of New 
Institutional Economics, aimed at the institutional environment and subsequent 
governance structures. Level 4 is more germane to the Neoclassical economics aimed 
at the marginal conditions. 
5.3 NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 
The conceptual framework depicted in section 5.2.8 is applied in conducting an 
institutional economic appraisal of fresh produce markets, below. 
5.3.1 Embeddedness 
At the embeddedness level it is clear that the markets were created to assist white 
commercial farmers with markets access and control of the supply chain. This had 
racial and political underpinnings which became covert and pressurised with a new 
political dispensation. Presently, the markets have to question whose purpose it serves 
since the old constituency have become politically marginalised and economic 
empowerment and political redress now dominate. The change however brought 
pragmatism, distrust and chaos that emanate from uncertainty. 
Factors supporting the Factors inducing changes to Results 
original system the system 
Afrikaner empowerment and Political transition to Economic andl political 
affirmative action democracy and redress power shifts 
Nationalism and white Non-racialism Pragmatism towards black 
supremacy Economic and political empowerment 
White farmer marginalisation of producers Confrontation and distrust 
favouratism/protection Oligopolistic supply chain Increased 'chaos' 
Insularity (intermediary power Discrete racial prejudice 
Racism Trade segmentation largely 
Religion along cultural lines 
5.3.2 Institutional Environment 
The legislation that entrenched the market system are largely still in place and the 
institutions thus prevail. Other factors have become critical in inducing change such 
as changes in the consumer base, market circumvention, viability of market 
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infrastructure, changing municipal priorities, etc. Hence, the acknowledged need to 
revisit the agency/commission market system, the need to cater for parallel markets 
and the formation of public private partnerships. 
Factors supporting the Factors inducing changes to Results 
original system the system 
Legislation and municipal Changing composition of Reconsideration of the agency 
bylaws for an agency based consumer segments system 
system Rise in the political and A search for empowerment 
Property rights remain with economic power of the informal mechanisms (little achieved) 
local government allocated to sector Emergence of sub-agents 
market management Greater stakeholder Greater vertical coordination 
Stakeholder based market participation in local by intermediaries 
management dominated by government and market Challenged hierarchy under 
agent and farmer interests management. high asset specificity 
Move towards private public (anomalous) 
partnerships Prospects of privatisation to 
Asset specificity of market facilitate private ordering and 
infrastructure efficiency 
Black empowerment Formal-informal parallel 
Increased upstream market markets 
circumvention 
Agent-wholesaler convergence 
5.3.3 Institutions of Governance 
Markets were governed by sales systems, insurance schemes, and rental arrangements. 
Various manifestations of opportunism, loss of location utility, and equity 
considerations necessitated changes. Changes should be aimed at improving equity 
and reducing opportunism. 
Factors supporting the Factors inducing changes to Results 
original system the system 
All sales conducted by market High participation cost to small Increase private ordering 
agents only traders (time) between all parties 
Insurance schemes to protect Substantial (unrecorded) Credible commitments 
farmer pay-off peripheral trade between formal retailers and 
Private treaty sales instead of Moral hazard and prisoners agents/wholesalers 
auction sales dilemma problems of market Less-credible commitments 
Commission sales to agents (sub-goal pursuit) with sub-agents, small traders 
compensate agents and markets Entrenched locational utility and farmers 
Control and recording of albeit limited space for Adverse selection (best 
purchases expansions produce sold elsewhere) 
Integration of complimentary Workplace equity More black (commission) 
services salesmen 
Floor space rentals per traded No black agents due to 
volume inappropriate system 
Inter-market price speculation 
Tacit knowledge with white 
traders and salesmen 
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5.3.4 Economic Performance 
Markets remain an essential price barometer 
Increasingly a residual market 
Decreasing market share 
Variety relatively limited 
Some value-adding due to locational utility 
Prices largely determined by large buyers 
Mainly generic advertising, limited promotion 
Entry problems for the informal sector 
Short formal vs. long informal supply chains 
The above factors are the factors issues at the operational level that markets have to 
contend with in the interest of relevance and longevity. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS 
5.4.1 Markets as Institutions 
The institutional economic premise that markets as governance structures should be 
considered as incomplete contracts, which would inevitably evolve due to bounded 
rationality, was corroborated. Bounded rationality emanated from changes in the 
value of agency relations, property rights, embeddedness factors, and market 
conditions. Since inception, the fresh produce markets have not made significant 
formal and structural adaptation despite significant changes in the environment it is 
meant to serve. The most important changes include: 
(i) The emergence ofthe low-income informal market. 
(ii) Sizable circumvention of the market by market players and others. 
(iii) Existence of informal market areas adjacent to the fresh produce market. 
(iv) Increased propensity to vertically integrate by firms who supply as well as 
procure from the market. 
(v) The increased importance of product traceability. 
(vi) The political intolerance towards white domination of market agencies. 
(vii) The acquired political power of low income consumers and informal traders. 
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(viii) The global trend away from commission sales through agents towards 
wholesale markets. 
The above factors imply that markets as institution have become increasingly 
incomplete and thus in need of institutional adaptation with regard to governance and 
subsequent economic performance. 
5.4.2 Market Failure 
Initially, public sector intervention in the provision of market facilities was justified 
on the premise that the private sector was not sufficiently incentivised to provide 
location utility infrastructure, of primary benefit to producers. Further, it was feared 
that intermediaries would exploit farmers (principle-agent problem) unless public 
control and institutional embeddedness are introduced to farmer-intermediary 
relations. The inevitable rise of intermediary power at the formal wholesale and retail 
levels, concomitant with the marginalisation of producers, castes doubts over the 
above position. Location utility has become of lesser importance to the formal 
distribution chain where vertical integration is the key means to ensure lower 
transaction costs. Market failure is however still relevant to the informal distribution 
channel where location utility is key to lower transaction costs, lower food prices, 
public health, and urban planning. Public intervention in providing appropriate market 
infrastructure seems justified (Karaan, 1999; CMC, 1999; MBB 1999). 
5.4.3 Markets or Hierarchies 
The high asset specificity of market infrastructure should, in theory favour increased 
vertical integration of markets as single firms. This did not occur, because asset 
specificity related risks are perceived only by the legal owner (local government). 
Some complimentary horizontal integration has occurred, but not within firms. The 
formal sector has already vertically integrated and thus not locked-in to share the asset 
specificity risks. Private agents have circumvented the markets or created wholesale 
infrastructure facilities, which meet their needs sufficiently. The informal sector 
agents can hardly sustain the infrastructure by themselves, which further exacerbates 
the asset specificity problem. 
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5.4.4 Transaction Costs 
The transaction costs pertaining to fresh produce markets are depicted below. The ex 
ante and ex post conditions are identified as sequential to each other. 
Ex ante conditions Ex post conditions 
Embeddedness Distrust 
Informational asymmetry Rent seeking 
Bounded rationality Price instability, price takers, prisoners dilemma 
Asset specificity Market dues, informal free-riders 
Bureaucracy Opportunism, market dues 
Moral hazard Policing costs, bonding costs 
Lack credible commitments Bonding costs, hold-up 
Perishable product Adverse selection, revenue loss, reputation 
Power imbalance Monopolistic inefficiencies 
Residuality Price inaccuracies 
5.4.5 Governance Structures and Property Rights 
The behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality, opportunism and asset 
specificity (as shown in section 2.6) lead to the recommendation of different 
contracting processes for the formal and informal sectors. The absence of asset 
specificity lock-in effects for the formal sector validates the tendency for private 
ordering and competition, as is the case in practice. Location utilities to the informal 
sector results in the opposite, hence governance is the preferred contracting process. 
This implies the development of parallel formal and informal markets where the 
formal market remains a residual one. Some (albeit less) public sector involvement 
remains necessary. The result is a hybrid organisational form based on a private-
public-partnership mutation as opposed to markets or hierarchies. The conditions of 
bounded rationality and incomplete contracts however remain valid, but survive on 
the 'remediableness' principle.4 Similarly, it is believed that the proposed governance 
structure will possess superior adaptive properties. 
4 Defines as an outcome for which no superior alternative can be described and implemented with net 
gains is presumed to be efficient (Williamson, 1996). 
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5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analysis and conclusions enable the following recommendations aimed at 
repositioning fresh produce markets from a policy perspective. 
5.5.1 Accept that fresh produce markets will continue to handle a decreasing market 
share due to vertical coordination tendencies for perishable products. Markets 
will therefore remain residual and subjected to adverse selection. 
5.5.2 Find credible complementarities based on mutual incentives, between formal 
and informal traders. These do exist but require greater bonding given the 
recent changes in embeddedness factors. 
5.5.3 Accept that the agent-wholesaler divide has narrowed, seemingly in favour of 
wholesalers. The need for legal provisions to enforce an agency-based system 
has abated significantly. This will begin to address problems of opportunism. 
5.5.4 Informal intermediaries (e.g. wholesalers, sub-agents) should be allowed to 
receive and trade produce without being subjected to the agency regulations. 
5.5.5 A private-public partnership model is proposed that allows for greater private 
ordering and private sector sharing of the asset specificity burden. 
The general recommendation is that fresh produce markets will increasingly have to 
operate in the private domain and will have to become more equitable in terms of 
participation and appropriate trading systems. Ultimately however, its relevance will 
not be determined politically but rather but its ability to serve its targeted consumer 
base. 
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CHAPTER6 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF WORKER EQUITY 
SCHEMES IN AGRICULTURE: THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 
APPROACH TO THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of institutional innovation as a key determinant of economic growth 
has received much attention in economic literature. Joseph Schumpeter in particular 
was concerned with this issue and the key role of the entrepreneur whose innovations 
advance growth (Demsetz, 2000). Arthur Lewis (1955) later gave further attention to 
the institutional factors in society that affect or determines economic performance 
such as property rights, population, capital, etc. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) later 
introduced the concept of 'induced innovations' where they argue that institutional 
changes tend to follow the price mechanism. More recent work relates to the 
innovations occurring in firms and industries that enhance global competitiveness 
(Best, 1990; Porter, 1990). 
In South Africa the debate on institutional innovation is largely fuelled by the socio-
political imperative to affect greater equity in the economy. This policy is further 
guided by a growth with equity strategy. For agriculture, this implies (inter alia) a 
focus on partnerships, contracts, joint ventures and the like. Agricultural workers are 
positioned as a target group for empowerment given their prevailing human 
(vocational) capital. Farm worker Equity Schemes (FES) thus emerged similar to 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP's) common in other industries. Whereas 
ESOP's appear to have labour productivity gains as their key objective, FES also have 
empowerment objectives. In FES workers hold shares collectively, obtained with state 
grants. Third party investors are often involved, including others who qualify for state 
grants, black professionals/entrepreneurs, private investors, or equity warehousing 
financiers. 
The research is based on the authors' participation, observations and evaluations of 
about twelve FES over the last five years. This involved several project visits, 
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stakeholder interviews, reports to government departments (Land Affairs, Water 
Affairs) and mentorship to selected schemes and key individuals over this period. The 
research was prompted by continuous inquiries into the effectiveness and economic 
empowerment merits of FES. The reporting on this is mixed and void of an 
appropriate framework for such appraisal. 
This paper is an attempt to present a framework from the domain of institutional 
economics to ensure that the evaluation is theoretically founded, sound and objective. 
This is then applied in analysis to identify the aspects requiring further attention to 
improve the empowerment model. The development of the conceptual model is 
eclectic, drawing on theory from across economics and social sciences. The analytical 
emphasis is on the extent to which the occurrences witnessed conform to economic 
theory as opposed to an empirical basis. Further empirical work could well draw on 
the conceptual framework developed in this paper. 
6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework for apprarsmg economic institutions is derived from 
Williamson (1999) as discussed in Karaan (2002a). This involves a three-tier analysis 
of economic institutions: (i) social capital, (ii) governance and (iii) marginal 
conditions. The discussion in this section follows in this fashion. Social capital is first 
addressed, including the power and control aspects. The focus then shifts to 
governance issues including: ownership and control, incomplete contracts and 
empowerment. Finally, the more conventional neo-classical aspects are addressed by 
tending to issues related to worker incentives, and finance. This methodology is 
certainly not exhaustive but the aspects addressed were selected on the basis of their 
relevance to Equity Schemes being appraised. This type of descriptive and deductive 
institutional economic analysis is uncommon in agricultural economics and 
agribusiness, and must be seen as an attempt to pioneer such institutional analysis (ex 
post) to enable agricultural economists to improve their understanding of institutions. The 
advances of the NIE in agribusiness studies and the recent work of prominent scholars 
like Alan Schmid (Robison, Schmid and Barry, 2002) and others clearly indicate the 
necessity of adding this type of analysis to the repertoire of methods/approaches. 
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6.2.1 Social Capital 
Social capital is increasingly acknowledged as a critical aspect in institutional 
economic analysis. It refers to the features of social organization such as trust, norms, 
and networks, and can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions (Putnam, 1993). Schmid et a! (2002) have eloquently commenced the debate 
on the role of social capital (SC) in the industrialization of the food system. Extensive 
work on social capital and embeddedness, and the implied path dependency in Africa, 
is found in the work of Fafchamps (1999). se can be considered a 'moral resource' 
that increases with use and depletes when not used, which means that it can have 
virtuous or vicious cycles. It is a public good as opposed to conventional capital, which 
is a private good. It often gets produced as a by-product of other social activities. 
Trust is one key manifestation of se and arises out of two related sources: (i) norms 
of reciprocity, and (ii) networks of engagement (Putnam 1993). Groups with 
productive norms of reciprocity (i.e. dense networks of social exchange) are more 
efficient in constraining opportunism and resolving problems of collective action. 
Networks of exchange/engagement can be formal or informal, vertical or horizontal. 
These networks (clubs, societies, associations etc.) can be intense horizontal forms of 
engagement that can be a vital source of social capital in the following ways: (i) they 
increase the cost to defectors in prisoner's dilemma situations, (ii) foster robust forms 
of reciprocity or acceptable behaviour, (iii) improve information flows about 
trustworthiness, and (iv) provide a template for continued engagement based on past 
successes. On the contrary, vertical networks are less successful in sustaining trust 
and cooperation irrespective of their density. Here, information flows are less reliable 
since subordinates hog information as a hedge against exploitation. In institutional 
analysis however, the existence of distrust is more important than trust. It is also 
difficult to impose sanctions against opportunism and such sanctions are less likely to 
be imposed upwards and more likely downwards. se also manifests as sacred 
symbols, attachment value, sympathy, empathy, and other non-economic features. It 
can also be bonding (within a group) or cross-cutting (across diversity). Groups who 
lack financial capital often revert to creating se in an attempt to enhance upward 
mobility and power. 
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6. 2.1.1 Collectivism and individualism 
The historical analysis of Greif (1997) provides an explanation for the evolution of the 
firm when embedded in a collectivist or individualist circumstances. Historically, in 
both these societies there was an initial reliance on the family firm, which served to 
reduce transaction costs. However, the further historical development differs starkly. 
In collectivist societies there is little incentive for introducing an organisational form 
that reduces the likelihood of forced separations. In individualist societies individual 
firms became family firms, but family members eventually became replaced by 
external investors, as equity became tradable. This implies a separation of ownership 
and control, which required appropriate institutions to surmount contractual problems. 
It is clear that in the industrialised commercial sector the trend is toward 
individualism and alienation of equity from the traditional family firm. In the 
developing sector however, collectivist traits are more observed largely for purposes 
of increasing bargaining power and gaining social capital given the lack of financial 
capital. 
6.2.1.2 Power 
Ownership implies rights over residual control of assets and residual income (or 
losses). A more difficult notion to understand is authority. Coase (1937) in his 
seminal article argued that authority is the key coordinating mechanism in the firm 
and justifies the existence of firms. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) however, questioned 
the source of authority in firms. Employer-employee relations are governed through 
authority with reciprocal loyalty and obedience, which is not necessarily the case in 
inter-firm (contract) relations (Masten, 1988). The source of authority is seated in 
control over assets (Hart, 1995) and longer-term sustainability. Workers tend to show 
loyalty and allegiance to gain goodwill to secure their contractual relation with the 
firm, but tend to have a shorter-term vision and expectations. 
A distinction must also be made between formal and real authority. Aghion and Tirole 
(in Hart, 1995) advanced the idea that someone with superior knowledge may have 
effective power so that those with legal power follow his/her advice. It may also be in 
the interest of owners to deliberately create an asymmetry of information so 
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subordinates may wield power to the advantage of the firm (i.e. intermediate/delegated 
authority). Intermediate forms of ownership are further discussed by Holstrom and 
Tirole (1991). These various forms of ownership and power are similar to Galbraith's 
theory of counterveiling power (Williams, 2001 ), which in this instance would require 
examining the extent to which workers are able to wield such power in the face of the 
economic power of the capital strong partner. This would indicate the level of 
maturity of the venture. This theory is particularly relevant given that workers should 
be able to exercise political power given their lack of economic power. 
6. 2.1. 3 Embeddedness 
Institutions are embedded in circumstances shaped by history and the characteristics 
of stakeholders, which frame the environment. Agricultural institutions viewed in the 
context of race and inequality tends to epitomise 'paternalism'. In his extensive work 
in this domain Alston (2000) finds that this notion comes at a real cost to labour who 
often pay for this 'privilege'. Farm workers are often embedded in dependency 
relations with employers for non-wage goods and services, which render them 
vulnerable to opportunism and influencing. The history of slavery cannot be ignored 
for its ability to impose a kind of moral overload (Kuran, 1998) representing worker 
gratification in this context. The question of race has also been acknowledged in the 
context of inequality and labour preference. Gary Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973) 
have shown for example, how employers would sacrifice profits in favour of a 
preferred racial composition of labour. Agricultural relations also tend to be 
embedded in sentimental attachments to land and physical location. This constitutes 
emotional goods and attachment value that implicitly influences economic decisions. 
6.2.2 Governance 
6.2.2.1 Ownership and control 
The separation of ownership and control is a subject afforded much attention in 
economics literature, but has found greater application outside of agriculture. The 
industrialization of agriculture and the increased cost of land have perhaps reopened 
the debate in agriculture. Generally, the theories of the firm commenced by Coase 
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(193 7) are considered best able to address the issue. The theory of contracts and 
agency become particularly relevant and can be traced to Alchian and Demsetz 
( 1972). They emphasised the use of contractual arrangements in appraising the role of 
management and their reward when efficient in monitoring labour. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) advanced this and proposed that contracts are mechanisms whereby 
principals could monitor agents. Fama and Jensen (1983) examined the role of 
specialised manager decision-makers who may gain residual claims on firms. 
Studies in agriculture in this domain initially focussed on the economics of 
sharecropping. More recent studies began to focus on the nature and role of 
management in agribusiness firms, including Roumasset and Uy, (1987), Gallacher et 
a/, (1994), and Ravenscroft, et a/, (1999). Studies conducted in an African and 
developing country contexts have mainly focused on contract farming (Minot 1986; 
Glover 1990; Glover and Kusterer 1990; Porter and Philips-Howard 1997; Delgado, 
1999; Karaan, 2002, Masuku, et a/, 2002). Institutional innovations such as contracts 
provide testimony that the industrialization and globalisation of agriculture will 
encourage greater institutional dynamism and the subsequent mutations of business 
models. Economic empowerment has to be considered against this backdrop despite 
the relative lack of evidence, as it is anticipated that agribusinesses will mimic the 
institutional innovations occurring in the rest of industry. Hence, the key question 
here is whether worker equity schemes genuinely constitute such innovation, and if 
so, what insights can institutional economic theory provide to improve them. 
6.2.2.2 Incomplete contracting 
A central proposition m this paper is that worker equity schemes as economic 
institutions are subject to incomplete contracting and the concomitant 
'remediableness' criterion advanced by Williamson (1985). This suggests that the 
prevailing nature of this institution must be imperfect given that it is still at an early 
stage in its evolutionary development. In addition it suffers from missing markets 
required to support its economic advancement. The purpose is then to examine the 
nature of this incompleteness in order to identifY the aspects that need to be addressed 
so that the institution can progress to greater maturity, if possible. 
87 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The theory of incomplete contracting was pioneered by Oliver Hart (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986) but inspired by Williamson's initial insights. Hart departed from the 
Coasian premise that firms arise when people write incomplete contracts and proposes 
that the allocation of power and control subsequently become necessary. Contracts are 
essentially incomplete due to bounded rationality, and non-verifiability of relevant 
variables. It is thus accepted that contracts are perpetually renegotiated and redesigned 
to gain greater efficacy despite the renegotiation cost. These notions of contractual 
incompleteness and power can be used in understanding economic institutions and 
arrangements, despite Tirole's (1999) objections to this claim. Incomplete Contract 
Theory (ICT) attempts to formalise the hold-up problem identified in transaction cost 
theory by considering the notion of residual rights of control in the allocation property 
rights (ex post). Hart (1995) claims that this approach, especially the inclusion of 
power, goes beyond the conventional modes of studying economic institutions such as 
general equilibrium theory, game theory, principal-agent theory, and Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). The latter is closest to Hart's framework due to its emphasis on the 
costs of writing contracts and the consequent contractual incompleteness. 
ICT and TCE are complimentary, and their main difference lies in their treatment of 
contractual analysis. TCE emphasises institutional adaptation whereas in ICT the 
emphasis is on incentives (Saussier, 2000). In ICT the contract role is to minimise ex 
ante investment distortions that may affect the distributable surplus ex post. In TCE 
the contract has two goals: (i) it is an incentive tool to encourage investment and (ii) it 
is a tool that promotes rapid ex post adaptations to enjoy residual rights (Brousseau 
and Fares, 2000). The basic proposition in TCE is that the variety of contracts 
elucidates the search for adequate organisational responses to differences in the 
attributes of transactions (asset specificity, frequency, uncertainty), which they 
monitor. TCE however neglects the role of power and the acknowledgement that 
institutions are designed to allocate power among agents (Hart, 1985). Dietrich (1994) 
provides a more detailed critique of transaction cost economics and encourages 
moving beyond this theory, revisiting Schumpeterian approaches and the principles of 
'Just-in-Time' management (Karaan 2002a). 
Four aspects are particularly relevant when considering incomplete contracts: (i) 
ownership, (ii) the boundaries of firms, (iii) securities, and (iv) power distribution 
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(Sausier, 2000). The former, (i) and (ii) refer to property rights, which is concerned 
with why ownership of assets (human and physical) matters? Generally ownership 
matters because it provides power when contracts are incomplete. In addition, 
ownership allows residual control i.e. the right to decide about asset use outside of a 
given contract. Conventionally ownership allows appropriation of residual income i.e. 
entrepreneurial profit. Hart (1995) makes several observations about ownership or 
property rights. First, an agent is likely to own an asset if he/she has an important 
investment decision (e.g. use, productivity, maintenance, etc.). Second, 
complimentary assets tend to fall under common ownership whilst independent assets 
tend to be separately owned. Third, increasing returns to scale encourages larger 
firms. Fourth, industries early in their development favour large integrated firms, 
which over time become de-integrated as industries become more successful (Stigler, 
1951). Fifth, a firm's non-human assets bind firms together (asset specificity). Six, 
control over non-human assets brings control over human assets. The above are all 
useful in the sense that they provide economic intuition and criteria by which the 
nature of an institution can be appraised. 
6.2.2.3 Empowerment 
Empowerment is defined by Blanchard et al (1999) as the process of releasing the 
knowledge, experience and motivational power of individuals. Empowerment models 
can be assessed in terms of the creation of physical and human capital. This is again 
used in addressing the fundamental economic problem of unlimited human needs and 
limited resources that encourage trade. The litmus test for economic empowerment is 
therefore whether an asset is created or transferred that can be traded in the open 
economy. In an institutional and poverty context, empowerment is defined as "the 
expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, 
influence, control and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives" (Narayan, 
2002). The definitions above direct the attention to (i) developing human capabilities 
(i.e. human capital) and (ii) availing a tradable asset, as prerequisites for economic 
empowerment. In the approach to developing human capital one should discern 
between capabilities aimed at upliftment and those aimed at entrepreneurship since all 
human capital does not translate into entrepreneurship. Upliftment and 
entrepreneurship could be sequential or parallel. It is thus argued that the 
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entrepreneurial process can be considered a three tier process commencing with: 
(i) upliftment efforts to establish a first threshold of human capital in the TW Schultz 
(1961) tradition, (ii) the availing of a tradable economic asset to enable economic 
activity, and (iii) venting entrepreneurship in the Schumpeterian tradition. 
6.2.3 Marginal Conditions 
6.2.3.1 Worker incentives 
It was already established that ownership justifies entitlement over residual control 
and residual income from assets. Ownership is however known to affect workers who 
do not possess control rights. Hart (1995) argues that ownership should reside with 
those who have essential human capital, and when asset ownership is appropriated in 
favour of those with relevant human capital, worker incentives can be enhanced with 
subsequent productivity gains. This in essence is the case for worker equity. Another 
factor is the case for delegated authority in intermediate forms of organisations. It 
must be acknowledged though that workers who have equity are still better motivated 
through short-term residual income (high-powered incentive) gained from maximising 
output, whilst management and owners will retain a long-term interest. Hence, while 
worker equity can reduce potential hold-ups by workers, it cannot entirely eradicate it. 
6.2.3.2 Equity finance 
The field of development finance is vast and cannot be extensively addressed here. 
Some observations are possible in this context. Firstly, good entrepreneurs tend to 
signal successful investments by financing such with short-term debt, and less 
successful entrepreneurs tend to shield risk by using long-term finance. The 
implication here is that good investments are those where the entrepreneur has taken 
first financial risk before acquiring long-term debt. Secondly, in case of multiple 
investors it is advantageous to distribute the equity and debt unequally or respectively 
so the different parties can exert pressure that encourages financial performance 
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Similarly, a firm should allocate short and long term 
debt to different investors since the short-term investor will more aggressively pursue 
financial performance and the long-term investor will be the more passive/patient 
90 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
investor (BerglOf and von Thaden, 1994). In risky investment schemes, both are 
necessary. 
6.3 INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 
6.3.1 The Embeddedness of Equity Schemes 
Assessing the Se and embeddedness aspects of equity schemes requires, firstly, that 
the motives for the formation of this institution be examined. Secondly, the nature of 
se and embeddedness will be assessed. The alignment of motives to 
embeddedness/Se will subsequently complete this (first-tier) appraisal. The purpose 
is to assess whether the motives for establishing worker equity schemes are 
adequately predicated on se and whether the se is likely to sustain the institution. 
6.3.1.1 Motives 
The motives for embarking on an equity-sharing venture with workers must be 
assessed on the basis of a genuine innovation in the face of transaction costs (asset 
specificity, uncertainty, frequency). The institution is primarily prompted by socio-
political imperatives for agrarian change towards greater equity in land ownership. 
The institution thus emerged from an attempt by the landowner to retain or secure his 
asset in the face of political uncertainty. Reciprocity is also alleged to be a motive, 
whereby landowners intended to compensate workers for loyalty and sustained 
contributions to the firm. The coincidence with political change however somewhat 
diminishes its importance and lends greater weight to politics and the anticipated 
transaction costs. Attachment value to land (emotional goods) is not considered a 
strong motivator for equity schemes since several of schemes have focussed on new 
land/ventures (i.e. growth oriented) with little emphasis placed on tenure security as a 
key motivator. Security of tenure is instead a consequence of the scheme. Another 
more meritorious motivation is access to alternative markets (e.g. ethical trade). These 
markets compensate firms for applying ethical practices as well as equity and 
empowerment issues. 
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6.3.1.2 The nature of social capital and embeddedness 
se can be assessed by looking into: (i) reciprocity and (ii) networks of 
exchange/engagement. Schmid agrees but also argues for it to be considered as 
sympathy or care (Robinson, et al, 2003; Schmid, 2003). Reciprocity was treated 
above (6.3.1.1). The engagement between workers and employers is generally 
embedded in a history of slavery, racial policies, paternalism, land dispossession, 
colonialism, social inequality, social injustice, constrained unionisation, and the like. 
This in no way suggests that equity schemes were all equally disposed to these 
factors. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that equity schemes have a relatively 
better than average record in this context. The landowners are observably 
entrepreneurial and progressive individuals/firms with a propensity for innovation and 
pragmatism. Nevertheless, whilst there is evidence of positive and above average 
engagement and care for labour, the entrepreneurial opportunism of the landowner is 
by far the key source of innovation and energy that brought about this institution. 
Trust as an indicator of se is irrelevant here since the relationship is de facto vertical 
albeit the fact that workers and employers are joint shareholders. Power and authority 
remains seated with the landowner, which if coupled with paternalism is more 
entrenched. Workers in the initial stages of the venture are active in planning and 
decision-making processes, but their lack of human capital in this domain renders 
them increasingly marginalised over time. The initial collectivist orientation, mainly 
induced by a small government subsidy, begins to give way to authoritarian 
management. This finds form in the leadership among workers taking greater 
responsibility in decisions and interfacing with management. Information 
asymmetries grow which leads to collective action problems and in turn erodes the se 
among the group. Similarly individual in the group become less appreciative of 
delayed gratification associated with bulky investments, which further exacerbates the 
situation. The resulting intra-group and inter-partner tensions have not induced any 
further innovations yet, which questions the merits of equity schemes as a genuinely 
evolving institution. However, this statement may be premature, given that little time 
has evolved by institutional standards. 
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6.3.1.3 Aligning motives to social capital 
It clear that some social capital is evident based on the relative traits of workers and 
landowners compared to the rest of the agricultural industry, despite the negative 
historical embeddedness. However, it is abundantly clear that the institutional innovation 
can mainly be attributed to the characteristics of the landowners and their subsequent 
motivations. The relative lack of human capital and cooperative action problems 
experienced is further testimony to this. Hence, the motives do not appear to align with 
Se. Progressive firms would indulge in ethical trade based on simple cost/benefit 
assessments instead of se. The institutional innovation as a credible commitment remains 
in question. The arrangement could be interpreted as covert opportunism by landowners 
to secure their assets in the face of uncertainty or enhance their returns in the marketplace. 
The opportunism is prompted by the initial trust of workers who expose their equity (state 
grants) to such opportunism, given their lack of perceived alternatives. 
6.3.2 Governance Aspects 
Appraising governance aspects commences with looking into the nature of the 
institution. This firstly involves an assessment of the extent to which the institutional 
arrangement resembles a separation of ownership and control. This is an 
acknowledged trend in modem firms and can be anticipated even in agriculture given 
the accelerated industrialisation ofthe sector. Secondly, the agility ofthe arrangement 
is examined using I eT whereby the incompleteness of the contract is acknowledged. 
The purpose is to identify, by way of reality or conjecture, the incentives required to 
correct for incompleteness. Finally, the implications for empowerment are elicited. 
6. 3.2. 1 The nature of the institution 
The commercial agricultural sector has faced economic pressures due to the 
liberalisation and globalisation of trade. This has brought failures (shake-out) as well 
as sharper competitiveness. Firms are perpetually pressured to craft innovations that 
will enhance global competitiveness. Equity schemes coupled with ethical trade 
strategies are certainly a relevant innovation in this respect. The increased 
industrialisation has brought the gradual decimation of the traditional family firm and 
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producer enterprises m favour of attracting non-traditional capital (Cook, 1995). 
Equity schemes appear consistent with this trend of diversifying the shareholder 
composition to attract capital amid economic pressures. 
Whilst ownership is diversified, control however is increasingly in the hands of 
specialized managers who wield considerable power and influence, and are often not 
from among the ranks of the workers. Although this arrangement appears best for the 
firm to maximize shareholder returns, it limits the economic development of workers 
to efficiency gains in labour effort. Efficiency and productivity gains are initially 
evident but are not sustained, never mind increasing, due to delayed gratification 
problems. This has become a point of contention and frustration for workers. The 
ability of workers as principals (shareholders) to monitor the performance of agents 
(management) is limited for human capital reasons. This asymmetry makes worker 
shareholders vulnerable to opportunism and has fuelled distrust especially against a 
background of racial prejudice. The residual rights and control of assets should in 
modem firms be seated de jure with the shareholders. The de facto evidence, 
especially from the few failed cases, indicates that the residual claims do not realize, 
upon termination or any other stage, partly due to missing markets for such equity. 
The equity is not easily transferable or tradable in the market and when equity is 
reallocated it is mostly done for financial relief and risk management. The majority of 
cases have not shown capital appreciation even by agricultural standards, but the 
exceptions are notable. 
Thus while the model appears to be consistent with the modem trend of separating 
ownership and control. However, the existing human capital and information 
asymmetries imply that workers are vulnerable to opportunism. Ex ante investment 
decisions of worker investors are subsequently subjected to opportunism in the ex post 
allocation of residual claims. As discussed earlier, trust is not sufficient to control for this, 
especially in an environment that is historically embedded in the exploitation of low 
skilled labour. The innovation thus seems better suited to less asymmetric situations. 
Several observations can be made regarding equity schemes as a means of worker 
empowerment. First, it can be seen as a means of constructive engagement with much 
space for opportunism given human and information asymmetries. Second, in the 
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absence of effective ex post monitoring systems, opportunism will inevitably manifest 
given the relative lack of social capital. Third, the model is vulnerable to collective 
action problems mentioned by Olson (1972, 1982) and discussed earlier. Fourth, there 
seems little 'incentive to alter' (Bardhan, 2000) the model, so that Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurial internal dynamism (creative destruction) drives economic 
performance (Best 1990, Dietrich, 1994). Fifth, government agencies responsible for 
supporting the model employ individuals with 'low-powered incentives' (Williamson) 
to ensure that the model works once supported. Subsequently, the model suffers from 
poor financial performance, worker frustrations, and increased dissatisfaction 
(Karaan, 2002; Tregurtha and Karaan, 2001; Fast, 2000). The problems experienced 
can be summarized as a combination of a lack of internal dynamism, covert 
opportunism, collective action problems and generally incomplete design. The latter 
specifically refers to the inclusion of high-powered incentives that encourage 
entrepreneurship and the problem of missing markets. The most important missing 
market is the market for empowerment equity, which once created in the firm, can 
hardly be traded in the open (or concessionary) market. 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 
Initial Investment 1" state of nature Renegotia- Delivery Payment 
contract tion 
Ex ante period Ex interim period Ex post period 
Landowner offers workers Human capital by exposure Dispersion of expectations 
shares Collective action problems Labour mobility 
Coerced worker Eroding of trust and SC Third party monitoring/enforcement 
collectivisation Institutional rigidity Develop counterveiling power 
Facilitation services Gratification problems Adapt grant mechanism 
Obtain state grants Mixed financial results Entrench residual claims 
Equity sharing arrangement Suspicions of opportunism Dynamic institutional evolution 
Limited worker Lack verifiability Include incentives for efficacy 
entrepreneurship Asymmetric power 
No counterveiling power 
Unproven residual claims 
Source: Adapted from Brousseau and Fares, 2000. 
Hart and Moore (1988) propose a timeline for analysing incomplete contracts and 
governance structures. This model is adapted to equity schemes in the figure above. 
The figure depicts 6 stages of contractual evolution which can also be aggregated into 
an ex ante, ex interim and ex post periods. The ex ante period is characterised to the 
point of the investment. The ex interim period elicits the key factors that shows 
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contractual incompleteness of the present situation. This enables the key challenges to 
be identified in the ex post period in an attempt the guide the requisite renegotiation 
that will deliver more appropriate institutions. 
6. 3. 2. 2 Empowerment implications 
Empowerment objectives have not been reached yet despite the initial expressions. 
The value of the acquired asset (shares) has little realised and has not exhibited trade 
value outside the firm. Real ownership as a means of power over residual claims and 
control has hence not materialised. This may also be due to missing markets for such 
equity, which is unconventional and not generally associated with promising financial 
returns. Empowerment must however be built on adequate human capital which 
remain lacking, despite some improvement due to the experience gained by workers 
in the venture. The heterogeneity of the group is not sufficiently acknowledged as the 
human capital and entrepreneurship can vary considerably. Workers at the lower 
continuum are frustrated and confused about the benefits of equity-sharing, whilst 
those more inclined towards management and entrepreneurship feel professionally 
trapped. This 'dispersion effect' is indicative of the need for institutional adaptation. 
6.3.3 On Marginal Conditions 
The marginal conditions referred to here relate mainly to those that improve the micro 
performance of the firm. In equity schemes these centre around worker incentives and 
finance. Equity is expected to be a key incentive to encourage trust, productivity, 
loyalty, commitment and the benefits ofworker gratification. The absence of worker's 
perceived power over residual claims coupled with the short horizon of workers for 
gratification has however dampened these incentives. While worker participation in 
operational, tactical and strategic decision-making occurs, it is reactive and limited by 
their ability to participate effectively at the higher levels. The process (participation) 
has become compromised in favour of the product (management targets). Leading 
workers often clamour for greater management responsibility, which indicates a need 
for greater vertical mobility of professional labour and talented workers. Human 
resource development plans require more attention. 
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Finance is a key determinant for the establishment of equity schemes, either as state 
grants or concessionary loans. It needs to be established whether schemes are 
established merely to access these funds. The evidence proves that ventures 
established where the landowner invests first and the rest remains bankable, perform 
better than ventures requiring concessionary funding by necessity. Opportunism is 
also limited in this way. Similarly, equity portfolios including multiple (private) 
investors with differing gratification horizons also perform better, given the respective 
pressures that investors are able to exert. State intervention by way of grants and 
concessions should thus be complimentary to private investment, as opposed to the 
trigger for empowerment investments. 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The institutional economic appraisal conducted in this paper confirms that equity 
schemes are subject to institutional incompleteness as proposed in ICT. The 
incompleteness stem from the lack of verifiability related to social capital, 
embeddedness, governance and micro performance. In addition, they lack the 
requisite ex ante incentives to enable ex post adaptation, counterveilance over 
opportunism, and the distribution of residual claims and control. The first reason for 
incompleteness emanates from the motivations ofthe initiators, which is opportunism 
by landowners to secure their assets in the face of uncertainty and/or enhance their 
returns in the marketplace. The lack of worker effort and options in the early stages 
raises credible commitment questions. Examining the governance aspects of equity 
schemes reveal that they are consistent with modern trends to separate ownership and 
control. However, a key concern is the asymmetry in human capital and subsequently 
in power, residual control, gratification, and ultimately economic empowerment. The 
analysis is aimed at identifying the incentives and innovations required to make equity 
schemes, as a type of shareholder contract, more complete and credible in an 
empowerment context. Recommendations towards institutional innovation are offered 
below. 
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6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.5.1 Project selection should favour the following economic criteria to ensure 
institutional sustainability over the longer-term: 
(i) Proven human and social capital 
(ii) Bankable irrespective of subsidies 
(iii) Progressive and entrepreneurial initiators 
(iv) Accommodate growth and equity approaches 
(v) Dynamic worker participation from initiation 
6.5.2 Power: Ensure workers have real residual control and rights that can be 
exercised. It is just as important to encourage mechanisms by which workers 
could develop and exercise counterveiling power to offset asymmetries in the 
allocation of power. In the context of information asymmetries, real or 
effective power should lie with those who possess more information. 
Operational information advantages often vests with workers which lends 
them to shirking behaviour and control over operational productivity. The 
extent of shirking or productivity gains is a function of social capital including 
aspects such as trust and subsequent devotion to the ideals of the firm. Since 
power in the firm is relative, the matter of empowerment is more effective 
when the emphasis is on ensuring a credible process than a premature 
product/outcome. 
6.5.3 Incentives: Introduce ex ante incentives to enable appropriate ex post 
adaptation and control over residual rights. Incentives and penalties are critical 
to encourage entrepreneurial behaviour. Entrepreneurship is the essential force 
required necessary to sustain economic institutions. These incentives include: 
(i) Short-term gratification/returns 
(ii) Upward labour mobility 
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(iii) Human capital investments 
(iv) Assist talented workers to take advantage of supplementary auxiliary 
entrepreneurial opportunities 
(v) Encourage 'dispersion' in heterogeneous groups 
6.5.4 Finance: Ensure projects commence with committed private investment and 
remains sustainable with private funds. Multiple investors constituting a varied 
investment portfolio should be preferred, and this can at best be supplemented 
by government-assisted programmes/institutions. Aggressive financial 
leverage is initially attractive when empowerment results must be achieved 
hastily. This is however, too risky in the longer-term given the volatile nature 
of agricultural investments. Concessionary equity investments that are backed 
by credible asset/fund management are a key requirement for financial success 
of empowerment ventures. 
6.5.5 Monitoring: Third party monitoring is required to curtail opportunism, and 
provide mentoring. 
6.5.6 Government support: Support should be more varied and flexible to adapt to 
circumstances initially and over time as the project evolves. Government 
should compliment the private sector instead of leading the way. It should 
incentivise private action, provide safeguards against market failure and 
opportunism associated with private action. 
6.5.7 Models: Equity ventures are but one model and several other models should be 
sought and allowed to emerge from these schemes. Hence, the further 
evolution of equity schemes should also be encouraged with a clear 
understanding of the real purpose of worker equity schemes. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SYNTHESIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the institutional dimensions that have a 
critical bearing on the nature of transactions and businesses that operate in a socio-
political milieu that is characterised by a need for economic empowerment. The 
contribution of this work lies in illustrating the application of key concepts 
(transaction costs, embeddedness, social capital, governance, etc) from the economics 
of institutions to contemporary problems in selected cases studies. This chapter 
commences with a brief exposition on the method employed in this study. This is 
followed a summary of the preceding chapters including the main theoretical Chapter 
Two and the case study Chapters Three to Six. The latter part of this final Chapter 
Seven is dedicated to an elicitation of the implications for institutional design and 
economic empowerment. 
7.2 A BRIEF NOTE ON METHOD 
In this thesis, various case studies were examined using a variety of different 
theoretical approaches referred to above. The case studies were chosen on the basis 
that they were characterised by the central problem of facilitating the participation of 
relatively disadvantaged individuals into competitive agricultural markets in South 
Africa. In principle, the lessons learned from case studies only pertain to that particular 
case, with limited implications across cases. However, as the analysis also showed that 
these case studies share an institutional environment that has certain common 
characteristics, it was possible to identify shared problems, and hence to search for 
shared approaches and solutions, as will be expounded in the rest of this chapter. The 
case studies were respectively examined by way of attending to ex ante design (oysters), 
ex-post design (mussels), historical examination of the impacts of embeddedness on 
performance (fresh produce markets), and of social capital and embeddedness (worker 
equity schemes). Introductory, theoretical and synthesis chapters were added. 
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The thesis is not conventional in agricultural economics research seen in South Africa, 
in the sense that it consists of several case studies that were presented or published as 
papers under peer review. This is apparent in the style in which the thesis is presented. 
This style accounts for the apparent repetition in theory, which was necessary in each 
paper to exhibit the theoretical premises and subsequent theoretical advances in each 
paper. It also accounts for the length the thesis and of each chapter as a paper, due to 
the limitations set by publishers and editors. The papers were published or presented 
between 1999 and 2003. 
The research method employed also did not follow the conventional empirical 
inductive method that has come to be expected of most modern scientific enquiry. The 
inductive method, which derives scientific outcomes from repeated observations and 
conjectured probabilities, becomes relatively limited when bounded rationality is 
introduced as a matter of reality. This is the so-called 'induction problem' discussed 
by Chalmers (1982)5• However, an important premise for scientific inquiry is the 
theoretical construct that precedes scientific observation, and hence acknowledges a 
theory-dependence of observations. The theory dependence in this research is 
institutional economics. While this approach also has limitations, it does not lay claim 
to the truth, and allows for falsification through more rigorous testing and further 
enquiry. In this respect the style is less rationalist, in the sense that rationalism lays 
claim to universal criteria to which scientific observations must be approximated. 
Instead, the approach followed is more relativist, which is aimed at obtaining 
scientific outcomes that are better under the circumstances, but not necessarily the 
objective best. The advantage here lies in the ability to derive and craft outcomes that 
incrementally solve real world problems under imperfect conditions without the 
burden of endeavouring towards universal standards. 
The theoretical approach is also premised on objectivism (as proposed by Chalmers), 
in the sense that the outcomes of individual actions are determined largely (but not 
entirely) by the details of the social situation and knowledge base. This places 
limitations on individual choice despite individual talents and dispositions, similar to 
the claims of Marx. The research was thus not aimed at deriving universal truths or 
5 Chalmers, A.F. (1982). What is this thing called Science? Open University Press. 
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any approximation thereof. Instead it is meant to obtain means that are relatively 
effective in analysing and understanding institutional outcomes under given 
circumstances with an interventionist agenda of improving the prevailing economic 
situation. 
The exhibition of mathematical rigour has become an expected feature of economic 
analysis, and standard in empirical work. The new institutional economics has been 
able to resist this temptation for some time, but is also now beginning to follow suit, 
given its innate tendency to be relevant and contextual. The older institutional 
economics has, however, shown greater resilience due to its superior appreciation for 
insight, understanding, institutional context and wisdom. Whereas the emphasis in the 
NIE is on tools and answers, the emphasis in the older tradition is on economic 
thought and finding the rights questions to ask. The purpose here is not to discredit 
mathematical rigour, but to place it in its correct methodological place as merely a 
tool. The quality of economic enquiry should come from its conceptual basis and 
subsequent economic reasoning. This was the approach favoured in this work and 
explains the tendency towards the old institutional tradition. The research does not 
rediscover the old institutional economics bur rather introduces its merits in dealing 
with institutional analysis in the field of agribusiness. 
The research method employed in examining institutions is derived from the four tier 
analysis proposed by Williamson i.e. (i) embeddedness of institutions, (ii) the 
institutional environment, (iii) governance of institutions, and (iv) neoclassical 
economics. The first research papers begin with addressing some of the four elements 
and the latter papers integrate all four levels in the analysis. This approach is 
uncommon in economics, but presents a more complete analysis of institutions in 
contrast to the contemporary approaches observed in institutional analysis. The 
conventional tendency is to use transaction cost economics, incomplete contract 
theory, social theory on embeddedness, or neoclassical economics (inter alia) in a 
segmented fashion. The approach followed in this work is more holistic and 
encompassing, and generates greater insight into the nature of the institutions being 
examined. 
108 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The research method employed entailed participant observation of case studies where 
the researcher is more than an impartial third party observer. The majority of cases 
studied involved observation and participation over several years before the analysis 
was formally conducted. This is premised on the notion that understanding of the 
problem/institution takes precedence over providing superficial answers on the 
preferred nature of institutions. Often, institutional/organisational models are crafted 
to achieve an idealised or stylised design such as contracting, equity sharing, 
franchising, agency, etc. without considering an appropriate design tailored to suit the 
broader institutional setting. On the contrary, an appropriate design, though more 
subjected to bounded rationality and incompleteness, has the key advantage of being 
adaptive and evolutionary as it matures. 
Submergence into the institutional setting enables the elicitation of appropriate design, 
avoiding the less sustainable stylized design. In this regard, the institutional outcomes 
anticipated or selected (ex post) were informed by the favoured business 
configurations that the experience and research observations (submergence) and 
interactions yielded over time as a form of consensus. For example, the choice of 
contract farming in mussels was theoretically validated but the experiences in the 
mussel industry initially favoured large vertically integrated firms. The research 
intervention facilitated the identification of transaction costs and subsequent means of 
reducing such costs through improved coordination and contracts. Hence, contract 
farming was chosen and implemented as the enterprise type with the understanding 
that it may become more sophisticated as the business evolves and contracts become 
mores specified to cater for reductions or emergence of new risks. Eventually this 
may result in a conventional franchise arrangement. 
The institutional models studied or proposed in this work also acknowledge bounded 
rationality and subsequent incompleteness. The implication is that all existing 
institutions or proposed models are accepted as remediable, which is the criterion 
required to induce adaptation and evolution towards more efficient design outcomes. 
The eclectic inclusion of incomplete contract theory is manifest to this recognition. 
Several propositions were advanced as aspects that matter in terms of the nature of 
institutions, and positively influenced or shaped the analysis. These aspects are 
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explained in chapter I and include social capital, history, governance, transaction 
costs, vested interests, and tacit knowledge. These aspects are particularly relevant in 
the context of their profound influence on the nature of institutions. Obviously they 
are not considered exhaustive. 
7.3 SUMMARY 
The objective of the study is outlined in chapter, which was to develop an 
understanding of institutions and its value in shaping economic outcomes at the firm 
level. The emphasis on understanding somewhat favours the old institutional school 
nurtured by John Commons and is outlined in this chapter. However, unlike some 
work on the economics of institutions, the neo-classical economics is not rendered 
invalid but advocated as complimentary to the new institutional economics. The 
emphasis is however placed on the nature of the firm in the Coasian-Williamson 
tradition and the reasons for the existence of firms. Given that firms are embedded in 
institutional environment, it is argued that in the analysis of institution several factors 
matter in particular. This includes: social capital, vested interests of actors, history, 
governance, transaction costs, and tacit knowledge. The chapter concludes with an 
outline of the thesis and brief summaries of each chapter. 
Economic development endeavours in agribusiness have much to gain from the 
theories and approaches related to the New Institutional Economics (NIE). The central 
proposition in Chapter Two is that institutions, as shaped by embeddedness and social 
capital, matter in determining economic performance, largely because they determine 
who takes part in the economy, and under what conditions they take part. As a result, 
much attention is devoted in the Chapter to understanding theories related to social 
capital. The analysis commences with an overview of the theories that relate to the 
roles of institutions in economic theory by identifying what institutions are and 
outlining their Coasian premise. The old and new institutional economics are then 
contrasted in order to illustrate the merits of staying in touch with the old institutional 
tradition, which continuously reinforces and expands the field of institutional 
economics. The ability of the old institutional theories to better deal with social 
capital is a particular case in point. This leads to some remarks around institutional 
analysis, where the role of social capital and embeddedness is acknowledged. The 
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next section deals with transaction cost economics, where the purpose is to identify 
the theoretical shortcomings of this theory with a view to moving beyond transaction 
cost analysis. This then leads to the key emphasis of the chapter, i.e. social capital. 
Finally, these theoretical frameworks are used to elicit implications for economic 
development and empowerment efforts in agribusiness. 
The main point of departure in Chapter Three is that small-scale mussel farming in 
Saldanha Bay is more efficient than production by large vertically integrated firms 
because a number of transaction cost factors favour looser forms of coordination 
between mussel production, marketing, processing, and the provision of support 
services. However, the structure and level of transaction costs also favours large scale 
farmers, and constrains the participation of emerging farmers in such contractual 
relations in the open economy. As a result, the transaction costs associated with 
mussel mariculture are discussed and analysed in this chapter with the purpose of 
identifying an appropriate farming model that favours small-scale emerging farmers. 
Four models are compared, and agricultural franchising found to be the most suitable 
to their needs. In this model the efficiency advantages of small-scale production are 
retained and high transaction costs are circumvented through more effective vertical 
coordination. The relative scale used to compare transactions costs across various 
models has limited methodological merit other than impressing on the need to identify 
the relative values, as opposed to the absolute values of transaction costs. The real 
merit ofthe exercise lies in the identification of transaction costs that require intensive 
observation and human judgement. 
Chapter Four contains a case study on the oyster industry in South Africa, an industry 
that can grow due to favourable natural resources and favourable market conditions. 
This chapter builds on the previous chapter on mussel farming where the need for 
contract arrangements was established. This chapter advances this work by accepting 
that opportunity for contracting between small growers and larger oyster farms are 
feasible, but pay more attention to the nature of an appropriate contractual 
arrangement. The possibilities of contract farming in the oyster industry are discussed 
by examining experiences with contract farming and the market imperfections 
associated with this model of vertical coordination. From this, the appropriate 
contractual arrangements are derived on which can be used in guiding the 
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implementation of a contract farming scheme. The contractual arrangement includes 
financing and securities, production management, resource provision, market 
specification, labour aspects, form size and facilitation aspects. 
In Chapter Five, a case study of large fresh produce markets is presented within the 
framework of the New Institutional Economics in order to investigate the implications 
for the formal and informal sectors under changing market conditions. Large fresh 
produce markets face the need to adapt to trends in modern day marketing of 
perishable products, mainly increased circumvention as the formal supply chain 
becomes more vertically coordinated. These markets, however, retain greater value in 
the supply chains that serve informal markets. In this chapter an institutional 
economic analysis is conducted to identify the factors inducing institutional change 
and to show how these bring about maladaptation manifested in transaction costs. 
These costs stem mainly from institutional embeddedness, opportunism, and asset 
specificity, which resulted in bureaucratic costs, moral hazard, rent seeking, adverse 
selection, prisoners' dilemma, and a lack of credible commitments. The identified 
transaction costs aspects are subsequently used in proposing more appropriate 
governance structures. 
In Chapter Six an institutional economic appraisal is conducted of worker equity 
schemes in agriculture. The focus here is on an incomplete contracts approach to the 
separation of ownership and control. The appraisal confirms that equity schemes are 
subject to institutional incompleteness, as proposed in Incomplete Contract Theory. 
The incompleteness stems from the lack of verifiability related to social capital, 
embeddedness, governance and micro performance. In addition, worker equity 
schemes lack the requisite ex ante incentives to enable ex post adaptation, are 
characterised by counterveilance over opportunism, and do not address the 
distribution of residual claims and control. 
The first reason for incompleteness emanates from the motivations of the initiators, 
which often represents opportunism by landowners to secure their assets in the face of 
uncertainty and/or to enhance their returns in the marketplace. Furthermore, the lack 
of worker effort and worker options in the early stages of such projects raises credible 
commitment questions, while an examination of the governance aspects of equity 
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schemes reveals that they are consistent with modem trends to separate ownership and 
control. However, a key concern is the asymmetry in human capital and subsequently 
in power, residual control, gratification, and ultimately economic empowerment. 
In this regard, the analysis in Chapter Seven is aimed at identifying the incentives and 
innovations required to make equity schemes and (other empowerment ventures), as a 
type of shareholder contract, more complete and credible in an empowerment context. 
Recommendations to advance institutional innovation are offered. 
7.4 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The method employed in this research was mainly conceptual, and progresses through 
various discourses and disciplinary domains related to institutional economics and 
organizational development. The four framework for analysing institutions guided the 
selection and application cases studies and the cases were thus selected for their value 
in addressing each institutional level respectively, though not exclusively. In the case 
studies that are presented, transaction cost economics is first applied, providing an 
introduction to the broader field of new institutional economics. However, while these 
approaches were found to be valuable in determining certain structural outcomes, they 
are limited in their ability to engender a greater understanding of institutions in terms 
of factors such as their purpose, nature, path dependence, etc. The result was that the 
discourse returned to the precepts of the old institutional economics, in which the 
analyst finds a cautionary note against the positivism, rationalism and reductionism of 
the NIE. In the tradition of the old institutional economics, the new institutional 
economics was further found to be too trusting of markets, to ignore welfare criteria in 
appraisals, and to be too anti-interventionist, i.e. to be too close to the neoclassical 
antithesis of the old institutionalists. 
While the old institutionalists were often justly criticised for being largely reactive to 
the dominant neoclassical paradigm, one of their greatest strengths for the purposes of 
addressing the problems at hand in this thesis is their emphasis on the key role played 
by factors such as social capital, embeddedness and the institutional environment to 
which firms and agents are subjected. This emphasis is consistent with Commons's 
definition of institutions as 'individual action controlled by collective action'. A key 
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implication here is that the earlier case studies reported in this thesis were aimed at 
eliciting institutional solutions, whilst the latter cases instead focused on developing 
insights into and understanding of institutions. This deeper understanding provides the 
basis for policy recommendations that take into account the particular difficulties 
faced by emerging farmers in the peculiar circumstances of post-apartheid South 
Africa. 
The early focus of the research was, thus, on appraising and recommending more 
appropriate or efficient institutional outcomes. As a result, issues such as transactions, 
organizational designs, agency and contracts were visited in various contexts. One 
strength of this focus was the resultant inclusion of incomplete contract theory, hence 
in part a saving against the tendency of the old institutional approaches to be reactive, 
relatively abstract and inconclusive. The analysis also moved closer to the concerns 
normally addressed in industrial organization theory, but did not venture fully into this 
expansive domain. Future research in the field of agribusiness could well take up this 
challenge. 
7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
The inculcated sensitivity towards institutions and the experience gained from 
indulging in organisations design has yielded important and guidelines and lessons 
that are valuable when engaging in this domain. This section elicits and offer these 
criteria and approaches in an attempt to distil the benefits of the study in the interest 
of similar efforts. 
7.5.1 Idealized Design 
At the commencement of this work the approach was primarily to obtain an optimal 
institutional design for an identified institutional setting, based largely on the 
existence and extent of transaction costs. This approach was prompted by the 
conventional approaches in the NIB literature. The strive for optimal solutions 
obviously has neo-classical underpinnings and is embraced by the NIB, though less 
favoured by the old institutionalists. Institutional design does not only evolve from 
optimisation imperatives. Optimisation is in itself a purpose and outcome of economic 
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activity. Appropriate institutional design is rather a process engaged in for the purpose 
of continued learning that is adaptive, operationally viable and technologically 
feasible. The acceptance of the 'remediableness' criterion and the inclusion of 
incomplete contracts theory implied that imperfect design is acceptable and often a 
necessary condition to induce creative dynamism of the Schumpeterian kind. This 
premise allows for frequent modifications to institutional design concomitant with the 
adaptive learning process. 
7.5.2 The Origin of Transaction Costs 
The existence of transaction costs is well acknowledged in the NIE literature. The 
emphasis has mainly been on their prevalence and magnitude, and the subsequent 
organisational responses to mitigate such costs. The first papers followed this tradition 
in institutional analysis, but in the latter papers the purpose was moved beyond this. 
The purpose became more of determining the raison d'etre of institutions as well as 
the related origin of transaction costs. Hence, greater emphasis was placed on aspects 
such as embeddedness, social capital, governance, and the so-called 'rules of game'. 
Therefore, whilst transaction costs do matter, it is equally necessary to make sense of 
where they originate from and why they exist. 
7.5.3 Creating a Learning Environment 
• The acknowledgement of bounded rationality and subsequent sub-optimality in 
institutional outcomes embraces Schumpeter's creative dynamism. However, 
this can only happen in an environment that is conducive to continued learning 
and adaptation, and that is consistent with progression in human and social 
capital. This process cannot be too precocious, but must rather be gradual and 
incrementally adaptive. Whilst the process can be externally induced, it must be 
directed by its primary beneficiaries to be effective and meaningful in terms of 
social and economic advancement. 
• Effective incentives and penalties are necessary to encourage progression and 
discourage failure. The design of projects should account for the skills intensive 
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nature of the business in a manner that ensures that the transfer of skills is part 
of the incentives and penalties of the project, and not dependent on the goodwill 
of either of the agents. Beneficiaries have to be rewarded in an empowering way 
for the acquisition of skills, and agents have to be rewarded for imparting skills. 
However, both should be penalised if the task is not completed successfully. 
7.5.4 Acknowledging Social Capital and Embeddedness 
The first tier analysis of institutions was established as social capital and 
embeddedness that further shapes the institutional environment, governance, and 
marginal conditions. Social capital in particular is considered valuable in facilitating 
and safeguarding transactions in the face of imperfect information and opportunism. 
The NIE has not given sufficient credence to this in analysis and institutional design 
efforts. The old institutional economics makes substantial contributions in this 
instance specifically. Institutional design is thus more than an exercise that involves 
addressing ex ante incentives and ex post governance. In addition, it should involve a 
greater sense of the key role played by embeddedness and the related factors that may 
either constrain or be ofbenefit in transactions and organizations. 
7.5.5 Human Capital and Entrepreneurship 
Economic development and empowerment in agribusiness is a central theme in this 
research. Prominent economists like Gary Becker, TW Schultz, Arthur Lewis, Francis 
Fukuyama and others have made substantial contributions towards establishing human 
capital and entrepreneurship as the real basis for economic development and the 
performance of individuals and firms. Institutional design can hardly substitute for 
this economic vigour and zeal. These two elements are mutually inclusive yet 
different, and both necessary conditions for economic performance and 
empowerment. The historical context of this reasoning could be seen following the 
Marx, Weber, North position. However, the economic empowerment context of this 
study is one of shorter term interventions required for economic advancement that 
takes the line of development as a matching of scarce human capabilities attempting 
to take advantage of ample economic opportunities. The opportunities act as a pull 
factor constrained by deficient abilities and entrepreneurship as advanced by 
116 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Schumpeter. Empowerment is considered this fast tracking process that intends to 
accelerate the rate of human capital acquisition whilst taking advantage of economic 
opportunities. 
7.5.6 Support Structures 
Softer dimensions like social capital, human capital and embeddedness must be 
complimented by harder dimensions such as governance, the rules of game and 
organisational design. Various designs/models were considered in the case studies 
presented in this thesis, including contract farming, employee ownership schemes, 
franchises, integrated firms, and agency arrangements. The purpose was not to 
identify model options, but instead to appraise the appropriateness of models through 
institutional analysis. The emphasis is thus on the support structures that determine 
the suitability of models, such as incentives, penalties, internal dynamism, transaction 
costs, etc. Once chosen however, the structures become deterministic in promoting or 
enforcing desired (and unintended) economic behaviour. The support structures are 
accepted as forms of incomplete contracts, emphasizing the need for continued 
adaptation in a learning and enabling institutional environment. Often, rigidity around 
chosen models constrains the required adaptations towards more efficient outcomes as 
the soft and hard assets of individuals and firms expand. On the other hand, the 
tendency to introduce leading models (e.g. contract farming) or early innovations (e.g. 
equity programmes) that are inconsistent with the softer dimensions could bear 
serious unintended economic and societal consequences. 
7.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRM LEVEL DESIGN 
In addition, to the implications for institutional design offered above, this section 
presents the derived implications and criteria that can aid in the design of ventures. 
7.6.1 Participant I Beneficiary Selection 
In situations where affirmative selection and corrective action is required, the 
tendency is often for first or third parties to select the second party beneficiaries. This 
procedure is highly susceptible to information asymmetry and bounded rationality. 
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From an entrepreneurship point of view self-selection of beneficiaries is more 
desirable and economically sound, given that so little is known about what motivates 
entrepreneurs to embark on that path. Self-selection procedures bring with them a 
greater probability of opportunistic entrepreneurial talent, whereas external selection 
often carries the guise of paternalism, intended worker gratuity, control retention, and 
the like. Under circumstance where natural entrepreneurial talent has been suppressed 
it must be assumed that such talent is destroyed, latent or distorted. Whatever the case 
may be, it is possible to rekindle this talent through effective mentorship. 
7.6.2 Mentorship 
Affirmative entrepreneurial development implies a deficiency in experience, talent or 
human capital to be competitive per se. This type of deficiency cannot be rectified for 
through mere fast-tracking, but can in the short-term be supplemented with trusted 
mentorship. Various types ofmentorship were observed: 
(i) The benevolent paternalism that takes charge of matters m an authoritarian 
fashion in the acclaimed interest of the intended beneficiary, with or without 
beneficiary approval and obedience. 
(ii) Self aggrandisement where the intention is to assist in the advancement of others 
to please oneself and to attain societal acclaim. 
(iii) Philanthropy where the motivation that underpins mentoring is Divine oriented. 
(iv) Incentivised self-interest where involvement requires an economic pay-off such 
as payment, business enhancement or socio-political gain. 
(v) Constructive engagement refers to mentorship that is fuelled by positive zest of 
individuals who perpetually strive towards positive outcomes. 
(vi) Goodwill mentorship where the mentor exerts effort solely in the interest of 
beneficiaries without expecting returns. 
The above typologies are only indicative of types of mentorship and are not mutually 
exclusive. They are all considered positive variants of mentorship as opposed to 
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opportunistic types. All may be equally effective in the short run, but the highly 
embedded ones (goodwill, philanthropy) can be expected to be more enduring. On the 
other hand, incentivised self interest is an effective catalyst towards human 
development and economic performance, besides the concerns over its endurance and 
sustainability. Hence it must be fuelled by high-powered business incentives in a 
manner that is sensitive towards human capital, incremental learning, overt 
opportunism and social capital Goodwill mentorship is considered the ideal type of 
mentorship because it is safeguarded with trust. 
7.6.3 Social Capital 
Initiatives that involve a greater degree of social capital have a greater probability of 
success especially given the incidence of trust. However, social capital is not absolute 
and can be eroded or destroyed by opportunism or chance factors. Social capital (as 
described in Chapter two) is a key ingredient, if not a prerequisite for building 
business relationship between unequal parties. This inequity is a feature of 
developmental circumstances that are exhibited in the various case studies. The 
anticipated mistrust and distortions in human and business relations that is 
characteristic of the socio-political context can be a serious impediment to economic 
activity that generates greater equity. It is necessary therefore to focus on the existing 
social capital and to invest substantially in the creation of social capital early on and 
continuously. This requires constructive engagement often initiated by the better-
endowed party that incrementally builds social capital from reputation, exchange, 
network access and exposure. This also implies that goodwill should precede self-
interest without obscuring self-interest. This further indicates that the lesser-endowed 
be afforded time to reduce informational asymmetries (transaction costs) before 
transacting. Some of the case studies proved that business interactions were facilitated 
initially by the available social capital between workers and employers (mussels, 
equity schemes). Non-performance or delayed performance quickly eroded the social 
capital that prevailed because transactions were expedited for financial or political 
reasons. 
A key mechanism for building reputational social capital and trust is by scheduling 
risk in such a manner that the better endowed party assumes disproportionate risk 
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earlier and gradually expose the lesser-endowed party over a longer time horizon. An 
important aspect of such risk scheduling is ensuring that intended beneficiaries 
receive priority over the 'tangible' returns. Poorer people generally have a shorter 
horizon for returns and it is important for motivational reasons to realise tangible 
returns over the short-term. This is also part of fostering an appreciation for the risk-
return realities of business. Building social capital also requires disclosure of interests 
by parties for several reasons. Firstly, a history of exploitation fosters mistrust and 
suspicion that must be candidly addressed before it can be eradicated. Secondly, 
candid disclosure of interests generates trust. Thirdly, understanding the reasons for 
engagement and disproportionate risk profiles promotes goodwill and reciprocity. 
They main implication of the above discussion for project design is that the need for 
building social places emphasis on the process of engagement as opposed to the 
desired structural outcomes. If the process by way of social capital resembles a 
credible commitment, the outcomes can be expected to more amenable to mutual 
expectations and incremental improvements (remediableness). 
7.6.4 Entry and Exit Conditions 
• The agricultural sector is notoriously difficult to enter for prospective farmers 
because of the high capital requirements and the industry-specific skills that are 
required. However, these industry-specific capital and skills requirements also 
make it very difficult to liquidate fixed assets if the farmer needs or wants to exit 
the industry for some reason or wishes to trade equity. Hence, there has to be an 
exit strategy for parties to a venture in the event that circumstances change in a 
manner that makes exit desirable. 
• Economic development programmes place much emphasis on identification of 
beneficiaries and the initiation of economic activity (i.e. entry conditions). This is a 
rational concern in a sector such as agriculture, where the entry threshold is affected 
by a relatively large capital requirement (because a high proportion of capital has to 
be sunk into land). Equally important however, is the need to cater for exit 
conditions in the case of failure to either penalize or relieve non-performers. 
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• The design of the project should avoid a situation where emerging farmers had 
to sink so much of the capital available to them (whether their own, borrowed, 
or in the form of grants) into land/asset purchase that the business enterprise had 
no chances of becoming commercially viable. This would require that 
innovative financing mechanisms should be put in place, including sources of 
equity; mechanisms to manage risk, which afford financiers greater comfort 
when used as collateral; alternative grant funding sources. It also requires 
project design that does not force participants into land/asset purchase as the 
only means of entry into the sector/firm. 
• A project should be so designed that there is an immediate and tangible return to 
the participants that would make a real difference to their lives. This could be in 
the form of business or personal assets. Care should be taken, however, that 
immediate consumption needs do not crowd out future wealth, although 
consumption needs should still be met. 
7.6.5 Safety Nets 
The same capacity deficiencies that establishes a need for mentorship also makes it 
necessary to introduce safety nets against the occurrence of chance events, 
opportunistic behaviour in markets, and information asymmetries. Safety nets could 
be insurance, risk management programmes, recourse (fall-back) positions, temporary 
limitations on tractability of assets in a worker equity scheme, training programmes, 
and so forth. 
7.6.6 Parallel I Concessionary Markets 
Economic development efforts are often plagued by market opportunism in the 
presence of weaknesses to contend with such behaviour in competitive markets. This 
makes it necessary to introduce incubation whereby emerging entrepreneurs are 
temporarily hedged against opportunism. This involves the creation of temporary 
parallel markets that ring-fences and limits open trade in aspects like equity, land, 
finance and commodity markets. Aspects that could be included in an incubation 
programme includes concessionary finance, targeted subsidies, concessionary 
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compensation, training, mentorship, preferential market access, reduced transaction 
costs, preferential information and business intelligence, and facilitation into enabling 
business networks. 
7.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT 
In addition to the factors mentioned under 7.6, a number of further issues may require 
specific attention when designing empowerment ventures. 
7.7.1 Definitions 
Economic empowerment relates to a situation where an individual or entity is enabled 
and acquires a tradable asset. Being enabled refers to the availability of human, social 
and physical capital required to managing the acquired asset in an entrepreneurial 
fashion. Hence, economic empowerment has human capabilities and tradable assets as 
necessary conditions for entrepreneurial behaviour when such behaviour is 
constrained. 
7.7.2 Beneficiary Selection 
Beneficiary selection is often viewed as an interventionist action of positive selection 
of individuals who are perceived as candidates who promise success. This is however, 
subjected to the cognitive and informational limits of the selector/s, despite their 
expertise. In reality, entrepreneurs practice self-selection, of themselves and each 
other, and this practice must be encouraged and relied upon for effective selection. 
Greater equity in selection can be prompted, but not at the expense of entrepreneurial 
talent. 
7.7.3 Social Capital 
Social capital lends much support to economic interaction especially when markets 
fail to provide strategic information (e.g. harmful opportunism, behavioural 
inconsistencies, etc ). Social capital is of greater significance in situations where it is 
severely eroded or distorted, like political, economic and human developmental 
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distortions. The tendency for business activity to be forged around weak links remains 
a realistic occurrence, but suggests that social capital investments in relationships are 
critical (ex post) to safeguard transactions against bounded rationality and information 
asymmetries. 
7.7.4 Embeddedness Factors 
Embeddedness of institutions has to be acknowledged and examined to enhance 
understanding of the existence and performance of institutions. Such factors are often 
obscured yet powerful in influencing behaviour and rationality. 
7.7.5 Mentorship Requirements 
Mentorship remains a key mechanism to contend with informational asymmetries, 
transaction costs, contract incompleteness and human capital deficiencies. It can be 
considered a form of human capital manifested in 'benevolent paternalism'. The 
tendency is to consider mentorship as a form of business relationship to mutual 
economic advantage. This view has an obvious business bias. Ultimately, it is 
contended that mentorship is a voluntary action based primarily on non-economic 
persuasions (e.g. self fulfilment, aggrandisement, benevolence, munificence, 
philanthropy) and secondarily on economic interests. The former type, has greater 
longevity, is more encompassing, and a superior form of social capital. The latter 
requires business incentives and elements of opportunism to be effective, and hence 
often limited to a particular transaction or context. These two manifestations of 
mentorship need not be mutually exclusive. However in a developmental context, the 
former is of greater value. 
7.7.6 Project Selection 
Empowerment schemes show better performance and resilience under certain 
conditions and project types. Positive selection around the following criteria and 
conditions should achieve better performance: 
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(i) Relatively lower technological barriers 
A key understanding of empowerment is that people are afforded an 
opportunity for economic advancement beyond their prevailing capacities or 
level of human development. Part of this deficiency is related to their abilities 
to contend with technology, and obviously a lower technology threshold 
suggests a better ability to deal with it and lower transactions costs. 
(ii) The possibility for technological progression consistent with capacity enhancement 
A further implication to (i) above is that technology barriers be deliberately 
lowered to ease entry and early adoption, and then gradually increased as the 
abilities are expanded through gains in experience, confidence, and risk 
behaviour. This was a key lesson from the mussels and oyster cases. 
(iii) Lower risk markets despite the lower return in such markets 
High investment returns are usually associated with riskier enterprises. Given 
(i) and (ii) above, such businesses imply larger gaps between risk and abilities 
of empowerment beneficiaries. Hence, lower risk markets imply lower 
transaction costs must be favoured. 
(iv) The availability of effective risk management mechanism albeit at cost 
Assumed deficiencies in management capacity emanate from lack of 
experience are other factors related bounded rationality and information 
asymmetries. This means that risk management become a key design aspect 
with costs implications. Costs may be the costs of incentivised mentorship, 
monitoring, insurance, safety nets, external management in the early stages, 
and various capacity building efforts. 
(v) Relative price stability 
Systemically volatile prices increase risk and are more difficult to finance 
when financial resources are deficient. Sophisticated risk management 
mechanisms are may be desirable but prone to error or mistrust when the 
requisite insight and expertise lacks relatively. 
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(vi) Incubation opportunities 
Ventures that allow for the introduction of incubation (see 7.5.6) mechanism 
should have a better success rate in the longer term because of the supportive 
environment and managed risk profile that is associated with it. Obviously it 
must be assumed that the incubation is phased out at all times. 
(vii) Relatively inelastic markets with established off-take 
The challenge of contending with production risk and market risk 
simultaneously can be arduous. Engaging in markets that exchange relatively 
price/demand inelastic goods and services has the benefit of reducing 
marketing risk. 
(viii) Possible slip-streaming with larger firms who contends with greater risk 
The ability to transfer or share a proportion of risk with stronger partner is an 
advantage to smaller/weaker firms. 
(ix) Avoid long-term lock-in effects that dampens entrepreneurship 
Ensuring effective exit conditions and avoiding constraints on the natural or 
accelerated development of weaker firms will promote entrepreneurial behaviour. 
(x) Initial goodwill complimented with gradually increasing countervailing power 
The goodwill upon which initial economic engagement is based should not 
remain but should rather accede to more effective counterveiling power 
between the transacting parties. 
7.7.7 Contemporary Defects 
Several fundamental and nuanced deficiencies were identified when appraising economic 
empowerment, which either constrain or derail the empowerment imperatives. Hence, 
they should be monitored, censored and avoided. The defects include: 
(i) Inclusion of adequate penalties and incentives for performance management 
Developmental initiatives, like the case studies are primarily impelled by 
political imperatives for equity that must gradually be transformed into 
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business imperatives to be economically sustainable. When such an initiative 
is led by the private sector (e.g. mussels, oysters, worker equity schemes) they 
attempt to gain maximum goodwill through corporate social responsibility 
motivations, and less by business growth and efficiency gains. As a result, less 
attention is initially paid to the design and inclusions of 'high powered' 
incentives and penalties that will bring about more business like behaviour that 
will more pertinently bring business growth, efficiency and sustainability. The 
goodwill intentions, though well meant, can dampen entrepreneurial behaviour 
and incite dependency among beneficiaries, as well as opportunism on their 
part to obtain benefits that they should earn through own effort. 
(ii) Opportunism in the face of informational and power asymmetries 
Opportunistic behaviour is an acknowledged feature of entrepreneurship and 
the private sector. When opportunities to vent opportunism are thus presented, 
it is expected that they will be taken advantage of. This is particularly likely 
under conditions of information asymmetries, which is s feature of 
developmental circumstances. Information asymmetries were identified in all 
the case studies and the implications deliberated. The initial goodwill 
exhibited is also meant to imply that the initiators of projects and to a lesser 
extent the beneficiaries, depend on mutual trust that is typically associated 
with weak ties (see Chapter Two). Whilst trust is an effective hedge against 
early opportunism, it is no guarantee against it later. When opportunism 
inevitably manifests later with prevailing asymmetries, important social capital 
is eroded and the sustainability of the business is threatened. 
(iii) Over-design of schemes in manner that is inconsistent with abilities 
Human capital endowment and expansion is a key proposition throughout this 
research and a prerequisite for successful projects. A common mistake 
observed with mussels (franchises), fresh produce markets and equity schemes 
are that initiators, facilitators or private partners tend to design project based 
on idealised outcomes (structures, performance, income, risk, etc.) instead of 
focussing on credible processes that will achieve appropriate self-determined 
outcomes. In the latter case, gradual expansion acquired human capital can 
influence the nature and design of the project. This was found to be more 
126 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
sustainable as observed in the case of mussels where workers were not 
encouraged to adopt franchises at commencement though this was 
theoretically the desired outcome. It is proposed that imperfect yet more 
appropriate outcomes be embraced as more sustainable since they are more 
consistent with human capital. A further implication is that they remain 
dynamic and able to incrementally adapt to human capital improvements. 
(iv) Paternalism that substitutes for entrepreneurship 
Benevolent paternalism is considered a positive form of social capital. Other 
forms observed includes: aggrandisement, philanthropic, empathy, dictatorial, 
condescending, good-natured, fraternal, or simply conventional (the right thing 
to do). In many instances observed this paternalism leads to the taking 
initiative on behalf of beneficiaries that absconds them of responsibilities, 
limits their appreciation for assistance, encourage opportunistic expectations 
and discourage entrepreneurship. Paternalism must therefore be appraised and 
kept in check so as not to replace entrepreneurial initiative. This is also true for 
government officials and facilitators who tend to drive projects for political 
purposes and targets, and in the process tend to take initiative that target 
beneficiaries should have taken and managed. 
(v) Lack of alignment between social capital and business motives 
For empowerment projects to succeed requires the availability of sufficient 
social capital at commencement and a gradual building of social capital 
through further interactions. When social capital is generally deficient or 
distorted by socio-political history, like South Africa it becomes more critical 
to ensure that a level social capital is built or restored before empowerment 
projects are commenced to elicit trust in the business oriented intentions of 
such initiatives (non-exploitative, credible commitments). In the absence of 
social capital, the business intentions would be interpreted as opportunistic as 
argued in the case of some worker equity schemes in commercial agriculture. 
The implication is thus that when: (a) social capital is deficient, it should first be 
built; (b) distorted, it should be corrected; and present, it can be capitalised on. 
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(vi) Substituting labour for entrepreneurs 
A common feature with empowerment initiatives in South Africa is the 
tendency to favour workers as beneficiaries in projects. It is believed that this 
can be attributed to paternalism and a concern over the transaction costs 
associated with less known entities or individuals. It is however argued that 
labour cannot be equated with entrepreneurs given that entrepreneurs must 
primarily be targeted to achieve sustainable economic development. It is 
conceded though that some workers may be advanced towards entrepreneurs 
as shown in the case of mussel farming, if a conducive environment and 
support structure is in place. Nonetheless, it must not be assumed that worker 
groups and individuals can replace entrepreneurs. In a country with a history 
of oppression it can be expected that entrepreneurship is subdued, distorted by 
opportunism or captured amongst labour. Worker equity schemes and contract 
farming operations are possible means of releasing entrepreneurship from 
labour. If this is not achieved, labour should be allowed to revert to 
compensation for productivity gains or normal wage labour as a form of safety 
net. Another implication is that real entrepreneurs can be allowed to contend 
with greater risk exposure in relation to progressive advances in human capital. 
(vii) Designing for structural outcomes instead of economic initiative/space 
Many empowerment initiatives commence with a search for an enterprise 
model that hypothetically guarantees success. This was the case with oysters 
and worker equity schemes. This disposition induces an institutional rigidity 
that limits the evolutionary dynamism required to allow the nature of the 
enterprise to incrementally adapt to the abilities of the beneficiaries. It may 
therefore be necessary to choose a less efficient enterprise type earlier and 
allow for a more efficient one later. This was the rationale with selecting 
contract farming in the case of mussels instead of franchising or large 
vertically integrated firms. Allowing this space for evolution is considered a 
key means of rewarding entrepreneurs for efficiency gains and risk taking 
behaviour. 
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(viii) Experimenting with failed collectivism for political gain 
The abundant numbers among the electorate, unemployed, labour and 
previously disadvantaged groups create pressure to empower larger numbers 
of people (i.e. broad-based empowerment). Another observed factor is the 
small state grants for land reform in the face of high land costs. These factors 
encouraged collective action in empowerment projects, which is largely 
induced by political motives. Collective action in land reform and enterprise 
development has historically been a feature in socialist societies, and generally 
did not fare well due to serious collective action problems. Such problems 
were particularly observed in worker equity schemes as well as the other cases 
though to a lesser extent. It is argued here that the failures of collectivism in 
enterprises be acknowledged and avoided given the capitalist inclinations of 
the economy. If not, initiatives could be suspected of political opportunism 
and casts doubt over the real intentions and motivations of engaging in 
empowerment endeavours. 
The factors mentioned above can cryptically be summarised in the table below. 
Weak drivers Strong drivers 
Workers as shareholders Entrepreneurs as shareholders 
Favour experience in labour Favour the youth as beneficiaries 
Groups schemes Individuals as partners 
Inclined to establish projects Inclined towards business 
Government driven Partner (private) driven 
Redistribution objectives Growth objectives 
Ethnicity stratification Black entrepreneurs 
Pursue pre-designed models Follow sound business principles 
Aggressive financial leverage Ensure equity contributions 
Paternalism Social capital 
Promote new technology Adopt proven technology 
Financial capital Human capital 
7.8 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research conducted and experience gained has highlighted several areas where 
further research would be useful. These include: 
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7.8.1 The Origin of Transaction Costs 
One of the first inclinations in transaction cost economics and the new institutional 
economics is to identify transaction costs and elicit their implications for institutional 
design en adaptations to create more efficient institutions. Often too little attention 
paid to the sources and origin of transaction costs and can subsequently lead to 
inappropriate design. Transaction costs can emanate from bounded rationality, 
information asymmetry, asset specificity or opportunism. However, these may occur 
or originate from any of the four levels/tiers identified for institutional analysis. For 
instance, opportunism in specific transactions may result from pervading opportunism 
in society and the economic environment due to the general lack of positive social 
capital or embedded suspicion and hatred based on a history of social and economic 
exploitation. Many countries with colonial histories of exploitation, oppressive 
dictatorships, ethnic conflict, class distinctions, and the like tend to reflect such 
opportunism. Such opportunism increased the cost of screening, monitoring, 
bargaining, securing and information. Institutions hence adapt to take the form that 
reflects the lowest transaction cost as opposed to the most efficient financial 
arrangement, as the latter could have a higher risk profile. 
7.8.2 Further Case Studies 
The use of case studies has a distinct disadvantage in that the evidence and results are 
should only pertain to the particular studies with limited extrapolation value. They 
were chosen for the value it extracts from specific circumstances and the insight and 
understanding they are able to generate. Nonetheless, more case studies of both 
qualitative and quantitative types are required to enrich this area of research to 
provide the subject with more evidence and material for drawing broader theoretical 
proposition and premises. This would also be useful in gaining a better understanding 
of the nature of institutions and their functioning. 
7.8.3 The Nature and Role of Social Capital 
A key recommendation from this work is the recognising the role of social capital in 
economic analysis and institutional examination. Traditionally, this is considered the 
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domain of sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers and the humanities, generally. 
Institutional economics pays greater homage to social capital and gives credence to its 
value as a vital factor and economic resource that shapes the economic environment, 
covertly safeguards economic activity, induces economic order, and imbues a kind of 
economic spirit and style. Young economies and democracies like South Africa often 
lack sufficient levels of social capital or fail to translate social capital into an 
economic resource. Densely networked expatriate communities, itinerant 
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial ethnic minorities, and so forth appear better at utilising 
social capital amongst themselves. This is more difficult in between ethnic groups 
especially in South Africa where the socio-political history has caused a severe 
erosion of social capital. Hence, more work on social capital will not only serve in 
understanding and enhancing its value in economic activity but also in dealing with 
manifestations negative elements from an exploitative past to create a better economic 
future. 
7.8.4 The Embeddedness of Institutions 
Similar to social capital, institutional embeddedness can have profound effect on 
economic activity as seen in the case of worker equity schemes as well as fresh 
produce markets. Embeddedness usually evolves over very long periods and hard be 
change over the short term. It acts as a form of institutional lethargy or resilience to 
factors perceived as foreign like an immune system. On the other hand, it facilitates 
the functioning of factors that are familiar through positive association and constrains 
the functioning of factors that are familiar through negative association. Hence, 
embeddedness is vital to the nature of institutions and aids in explaining the 
rationality of institutional behaviour. Economic research too often assumes certain 
rationality (e.g. neo classics) premised on strict assumptions and conditionalities that 
ignores embeddedness and may lead to misinterpretations. This was observed in the 
case of mussels where small growers and franchising was found the most efficient 
organisational form, but the industry to this day remains slow to adapt to this form. 
Similarly, fresh produce markets are based on agency based commission sales 
systems and remain resilient to adapt to more efficient wholesaling systems as 
observed through direct sales and the development of similar markets across the 
world. Workers equity schemes are embedded on a long history of problematic race 
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relations, slavery and paternalism. This is partly the reason for prefer equity schemes 
with workers a opposed to empowering new entrepreneurs through more appropriate 
organisational forms in a democratised environment. 
7.8.5 Institutional Design and Business Models 
The thesis primarily aimed to identify business models that are suited to various 
institutional circumstances. Those contended with include contract farming, 
franchising, small-scale farming (per se), vertically integrated firms, equity 
partnerships, and agency systems. Different institutional circumstances would 
generate further models and would enrich this area of study and the choices available 
to the business environment as well as those engaged in institutional design. Further 
studies could look into the appropriateness of given models under particular 
circumstances or the design of new models given a thorough understanding of the 
institutional circumstances. This is particularly relevant in developing economies 
where new business models as continuously sought that resemble greater equity, 
efficiency, social justice and moreover unleashing entrepreneurial talent. 
7.8.6 Industrial Organisation in Agribusiness 
The search for institutional models in developing economies is concomitant to the 
industrialisation of the agri-food chain, the gaining significance of the value chain, the 
power shift towards retailing, and the so-called disappearance of the traditional farm 
gate. Agricultural economists have developed sophisticated tools for analysis at farm 
level, but are not equally adept at analysing an industrialised value chain. The use of 
Structure-Conduct-Performance approaches and the conventional technical efficiency 
measures are rendered obsolete or blunt despite its obvious theoretical aptness. All the 
case studies have elements that are located beyond the farm gate where institutional 
economics were found useful in understanding and examining performance. In all the 
case studies the motivations underpinning firm size, inter-firm thresholds, intra-firm 
efficiency boundaries and associated risks were considered. However, this work is 
still rudimentary and requires further application to enhance its value and substance in 
the economics of agriculture and development. 
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7.8.7 The Evolution and Behaviour of Firms and Institutions 
A key proposition of the research is that institutions should be viewed as continuously 
evolving entities as they operate under dynamic conditions. This view is distilled from 
the work of Schumpeter on constructive dynamism or creative destruction. The case 
studies are largely temporal since in three of the cases the firms are start-ups or early 
innovations. The fourth, fresh produce markets have a long institutional history to 
gauge institutional adaptation and dynamism against, which was found generally 
lacking. Further valuable research could include tracking institutional adaptation over 
time with changing circumstances to identify efficient adaptations. In addition, new 
institutions could be assessed in terms of its ability to evolve when conditions inevitably 
change and to enable proactive design interventions based on anticipated behaviour. 
7.8.8 Empowerment 
The economic advancement of previously disadvantaged people is a common 
imperative shared by all the case studies. This form of empowerment is seen as a 
process of enabling people to acquire and manage economic assets that they are not 
adequately prepared for, hence the need for enabling institutions, supporting environs 
and mechanisms. Each case study goes some way in this context, but further work is 
required to enrich this area that has gained much prominence in South Africa recently. 
Similarly, such work will remain equally relevant in future where tracking the 
performance of economic empowerment initiatives will be necessary to monitor 
opportunism, effectiveness and likely unintended consequences. 
7.8.9 Law and Contracts 
Institutional economics has found a natural extension into the area of law and 
contracts due to the emphasis on inter-firm relations, safeguarding transactions, 
property rights, agency, enforcement, etc. Agribusiness and the industrialised food 
economy have an obvious need for such insights and services. Future research would 
inevitably have to accommodate this discipline. It is interesting that several of the 
esteemed scholars in institutional economics, including Coase and Williamson have 
an academic footing in this domain. 
133 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
